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Participatory Democracy: The Bridge from Civil Rights to Women's Liberation

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Abstract:

This paper explores the connection between the participatory democracy which characterized the tactics of the Civil Rights Movement and the participatory democracy which colored the events of the Women's Liberation Movement, occurring in the 1970's-1980's. This paper commences by interpreting the definition of "participatory democracy," from the perspective of Civil Rights leaders, historians, and political theorists. Using these persons' definitions of participatory democracy, which are translated into their texts as both abstract definitions and concrete historical events, these two social movements are coalesced. This paper describes the participatory democracy of the Civil Rights Movement as the bridge from civil rights to modern women's liberation. Throughout the paper, the Civil Rights Movement is regarded as the precedent that opened the doors for the Women's Liberation Movement. The research for this paper has been derived from a myriad of sources. Among the works examined are: narrative histories of both the Civil Rights Movement and the Women's Liberation Movement, written by participants of these two movements, texts describing the employment of participatory democracy in European social movements, and the works of political theorists, those of whom have dedicated their research to explaining the phrase "participatory democracy." This paper focuses solely on the most recent aspects of the Women's Liberation Movement, which began within five years after the apex of the Civil Rights Movement. Attention is not given to the attainment of women's suffrage in the early 20th century, as the timeline of the paper begins with the Civil Rights Movement.

Introduction

How has the status of certain groups in our society evolved in the course of forty years? African-Americans will cite the benefits reaped from the Civil Rights Movement, a lengthy and arduous battle fought by both African-American males and females, in an attempt to acquire more desirable treatment. Career women may cite the advances made in the workplace and in higher education institutions, namely equal opportunity employment laws, sexual harassment policies, maternity leave, equal pay, and affirmative action programs. The links between the Civil Rights Movement and the women's liberation movement cannot be denied, as the two movements are inextricably linked by the democratic tactics employed in both movements. Perhaps, the most important link between the Civil Rights Movement and the women's movement is the democratic concept of "participatory democracy." A concept adopted by Civil Rights leader Ella Baker known as "participatory democracy" found its way into the women's movement. Participatory democracy can best be explained as the bridge connecting the goals of these two movements, as well as the bridge which solidified the achievement of greater rights for both minorities and women.

Structure of Paper

This paper commences with a broad definition of participatory democracy as it relates to the execution of various social movements. Next, this paper discusses Civil Rights activist Ella Baker's interpretation of participatory democracy as well as how Baker infused elements of participatory democracy into the structures and ideologies responsible for the success of the Civil Rights Movement. Examples of participatory democracy's role in the Civil Rights Movement are analyzed. Finally this paper examines how participatory democracy served as a bridge linking together two social movements, the Civil Rights Movement with the Women's Movement. The ideologies and structures inherent to the Women's Movement are compared and contrasted with the ideologies and structures that characterized the Civil Rights Movement, particularly the ideologies and structures promoting participatory democracy. This section of the paper analyzes the ideologies and structures characteristic of separate racial and socioeconomic groups of females participating in the greater Women's Movement. The separatist structure of the women's groups encompassing the Women's Movement is contrasted with the non-separatist structure of the Civil Rights Movement groups. Finally, this paper concludes by tying

together the two social movements' dependence on participatory democracy as a means of initiating social reforms.

Defining Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy means exactly what it says. The origins of the two constituent terms, the Latin *partis* and *capere* and the Greek *demos* and *kratein*, which compose the words "participatory democracy" can be translated into English as "taking part in rule by the people" (Cook, p.2) According to political theorists, participatory democracy embraces two main ideas: a decentralization of authoritative decision-making and a direct involvement of amateurs or non-elites in the political decision-making process. Proponents of participatory democracy argue that citizens' direct participation in the political process serves to make men and women better citizens. More importantly, they argue that citizens' direct participation in the political process will lead to political decisions which are more beneficial to the non-elites involved (Cook, p.7).

Past political theorists from Alexis de Tocqueville to Frantz Fanon have argued in favor of direct participation believing that it will serve as an educational experience to all people involved, shaping their beliefs, attitudes, and values (Cook, p.7). An enhanced political efficacy, or man's sense of his ability to effectively alter his environment through political participation, appears to be political theorists' greatest argument for the case of participatory democracy. Cook characterizes today's age of business and bureaucratization as a complex age which makes common men people feel powerless and leads them to be apathetic. Cook defends participatory democracy by stating, " Only a change in the decision-making patterns can overcome this sense of powerlessness and the resultant apathy; for it is not by occasionally voting for authorities in the isolation of a curtained booth, but by actual engagement in making authoritative decisions in concert with persons like himself, that will serve to reinforce the average man's appreciation of his own political capacities (Cook, p. 8).

Ella Baker's Endorses Participatory Democracy

Civil Rights activist Ella Baker used participatory democracy at the height of the Civil Rights movement to demonstrate a black mass' desire for transformation of the status quo way of life in the South. The tenets which composed Baker's ideal of participatory democracy are

reflective of the tenets of participatory democracy that are articulated in Cook's book by earlier political theorists such as de Toqueville and Aristotle. The Ella Baker definition of participatory democracy which fuelled the successes of the Civil Rights movement includes three main ideas: grassroots involvement of people throughout society in the elitist decisions which have dominated their lives, absence of emphasis on a hierarchy or one celebrity leader as the sole leadership for the movement, and a call for direct action by all involved as an answer to present and past oppression by the majority, white race (Mueller, p. 52). Much like the definition of participatory democracy articulated by political theorists, Baker stresses the importance of mass mobilization and grassroots action executed by the amateurs, often affected by the decisions devolved from the centralized elites, as well as a reduction in decisions made by elites.

Baker won civil rights for blacks by staying loyal to the concept of participatory democracy. Early on Baker spoke out against the celebrity of Martin Luther King, Jr. during the movement. She felt the emphasis on one leader's work negated the democratic character of the movement, reflected in the massive groups of blacks who organized voter registration drives at the local level, staged sit-ins at white restaurants, and gathered regularly in local churches to plan movement strategy. Just as political theorists praise participatory democracy's ability to enhance the common man's political efficacy, Ella Baker also appreciated participatory democracy for its ability to empower common people to seek social change. Baker found Martin Luther King, Jr's "charismatic ministerial leadership" to be at odds with enhancing citizens' political efficacy (Mueller, p. 62).

The grassroots activism Baker promoted throughout the Civil Rights Movement found its way into the employment of noteworthy tactics responsible for the movement's success. Baker continually emphasized the importance of developing black people's resources and institutions. During her tenure as an employee of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the 1950's, Baker traveled to local communities setting up drives to get blacks registered to vote in the South and meeting with ministerial leaders to encourage the presence of reading and writing classes within the church that would provide blacks with the skills necessary for voting (Mueller, p. 58).

Mass meetings became the best tool for drawing together all of the African-Americans within a community on a regular basis. African-Americans would meet in their local churches for worship as well as strategy

sessions, as they ironed out the details of future tactics to be employed in the movement. Mass meetings could be educational as well as sacred. Sometimes speakers from other surrounding areas would come to distant churches and discuss the progress of the movement. Medgar Evers, a frequent and popular speaker in Greenwood, would bring word of the occurrences in Jackson, Mississippi at the local NAACP office (Payne, p. 259). The meetings seemed to promote community and break down any feelings of isolation formerly experienced by the African-Americans in attendance. The speakers from other places who appeared at diverse local Civil Rights mass meetings reinforced the local citizens' sense of being part of a bigger movement than what they saw in their local community; they encouraged them to keep up the fight by organizing again and again at the grass-roots level.

Ella Baker's pet group, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, believed in motivating people at the grassroots level through recognition at mass meetings (Payne, p. 259). Charles M. Payne, the author of I've Got the Light of Freedom , writes, "At mass meetings in Greenwood, Mississippi, local activists might find themselves sharing a platform with heroes like Medgar Evers or Dick Gregory, or later with Harry Belafonte or Sidney Poitier, or perhaps even Martin Luther King, Jr., himself (Payne, p. 260). Other ways participatory democracy encouraged action was through public pressure and consciousness-raising. At a Greenwood, Mississippi meeting a local leader asked all of the African-Americans who had registered to vote earlier in the day to raise their hands. After giving a short pep talk on the importance of registering to vote, he asked all of the persons who had not raised their hands to follow him to the courthouse the following day to register to vote (Payne, p. 260). There was significant pressure to attend such mass meetings. Canvassers went door to door throughout their local communities passing out handbills that advertised the next mass meeting in which Civil Rights tactics would be discussed. This local pressure, along with the positive feeling of being included in an honorable cause, incited direct action at the local level from blacks representing all walks of life. Additionally, local movement participants encouraged others to remain in the fight for civil rights by engaging in consciousness-raising. At weekly mass meetings, local members of Civil Rights groups would take turns sharing personal stories of the injustices they had endured from whites. This politicization of personal problems linked Civil Rights participants together in a mission to transform their personal injustices into healthy, political reforms.

Riding the Wave of Civil Rights Legislation

By 1964, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plethora of the Civil Rights activists' goals had come into fruition. A Voting Rights Act in 1965 struck down the undemocratic voting practices that had formerly been rampant in the South, in particular in Mississippi, where southern blacks were denied the right to vote if they could not appropriately understand a clause of the state constitution. The Civil Rights activists' adherence to the concept of participatory democracy brought fruits to the African-American population in the form of anti-discriminatory legislation. Piggy-backing off of the achievements of the Civil Rights activists, women, another second-class group in society, rushed to reap the rewards of the Civil Rights movement. Capitalizing on the reforms initiated in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, women mobilized to initiate their own liberation movement.

At the height of the Civil Rights movement, women such as former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt and Esther Peterson, communicated their sense of an inferior status in society to officials like President John F. Kennedy. Democratic Party activists like Emma Guffey Miller and Eleanor Roosevelt criticized Kennedy's lack of female appointments to his administration (Hartmann, p. 50). Kennedy tried to silence these women's criticism by forming a Commission on the Status of Women. Participating on Kennedy's Commission was Civil Rights activist Pauli Murray. Murray believed that just as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution could be interpreted to advocate against racial discrimination, it could also be interpreted by the Supreme Court to prohibit sex discrimination (Hartmann, p. 52).

The first legislation women used to piggy-back off of the Civil Rights reforms was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Southern members of Congress, who were eager to not see the prohibition of discrimination of race in employment matters, supported women's efforts to add the prohibition of discrimination of sex to the legislation. Anticipating a killing of this revised, loaded bill, Southern congressmen vocalized their support of the "sex" provision of Title VII. Much to their chagrin, Title VII garnered enough votes to pass with the inclusion of both a "race" provision and a "sex" provision prohibiting employer discrimination against these two groups.

Crossing the Bridge- Linking Movements

Advancing women's liberation was not limited to women's attempts to be included in Civil Rights legislation, women also adopted some of the popular participatory tactics of the Civil Rights movement. Women found value in Civil Rights tactics such as sit-ins, marches, grassroots campaigns, and consciousness-raising. Participatory democracy became the invaluable bridge linking the accomplishments of Civil Rights to the desires and goals of women's liberation activists.

Participatory Democracy in the Women's Movement

Previous participation in the Civil Rights movement fuelled many white females' involvement in the women's liberation movement. In 1960 the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee was formed by a group of black southern college students seeking to end racial segregation in the South. During the early 1960's, large numbers of white male and female college students spent their summers advocating for civil rights in the South. White, female college students fought alongside men in the Civil Rights movement only to find that they, too, were victims of discrimination.

In an anonymous paper presented at an SNCC retreat in November 1964, white women wrote, "It needs to be known that just as Negroes were the crucial factor in the economy of the cotton South, so too in SNCC, women are the crucial factor that keeps the movement running on a day-to-day basis. Yet they are not given equal say-so when it comes to day-to-day decision-making" (Polletta, p. 155). This paper listed a series of indignities including women's exclusion from important SNCC meetings or being relegated to taking minutes or performing clerical duties rather than being afforded committee chair positions. Hole and Levine write in Rebirth of Feminism that the female members of the SNCC were ostracized from policy-making. Rather than making policy, these females served as a "sexual supply for their male comrades after hours" (Hole and Levine, p. 110). Females in the Civil Rights Movement were conscientious of the irony stemming from their participation in the movement, namely that "the price for participating in a battle for someone else's equality was the loss of one's own equality" (Hole and Levine, p. 110).

The women in the SNCC serve as an important link between the Civil Rights Movement and the Women's Movement. Participation in

the Civil Rights Movement empowered SNCC women to challenge their inferior status to men by affording these women the opportunity to articulate their opinions. Although men did not respond to women's calls for abolishing their second-class status, women in the reform movement possessed a confidence and candor their sisters back home lacked. The authors of Rebirth of Feminism speak of the SNCC women's participating by stating, "You are allowed to participate and to speak, only the men stop listening when you do" (Hole and Levine, p. 111). The environment of reform surrounding the female members of the SNCC only encouraged these women to pursue more reforms. Once these women realized that they possessed the skills necessary for initiating reform, they began to resent performing the mundane tasks reflective of their second-class status. Polletta writes that "it was this contradiction that generated an incipient female consciousness (Polletta, p. 155).

Following the Civil Rights Movement, in the late 1960's, women's consciousness-raising groups began to spring up across the country. Analogous to the civil rights groups formed throughout the South in small towns, women's liberation groups were intimate, informal, and egalitarian, lacking one central leader. Baker's definition of participatory democracy found its way into the organization and administration of these women's liberation groups. Much like African-Americans, white women had been denied opportunities to learn leadership skills. Female consciousness-raising groups, organized at the grassroots level, served to provide women with valuable leadership skills. Heather Booth, a former white participant in the SNCC, recognizes the importance of participatory democracy to the women's liberation groups when she says, "Women had been so blocked from positions of authority that they needed to learn those skills" (Polletta, p. 160). Women's groups enhanced their members' political efficacy by allowing members to make decisions jointly, rotate leadership positions, and take turns articulating the group's position to the public. Women's liberation groups advocated members' realization of their full potential as well as sisterhood and equality. Like the Civil Rights Movement activists, women helped each other recognize their full potential by engaging in consciousness-raising (Polletta, p. 161).

The SNCC summer volunteers introduced consciousness-raising to the women's movement. Much like Civil Rights Movement activists shared their personal stories as a means of developing trust and intimacy among other activists, women participating in the liberation movement utilized consciousness-raising for an analogous purpose. For women,

consciousness-raising was a means of eliciting personal experiences before moving on to an action plan. Consciousness-raising in the female liberation movement emphasized the democratic nature of the movement by forcing interaction among members through a sharing of personal stories as well as through collective decision-making (Polletta, p. 161). Women's liberation members resented hierarchy and celebrity leadership for the same reason as Ella Baker. They knew that singling out members in the movement for particular recognition would erode the main foundation of the women's movement, its inclusion and celebration of common women.

Theory Driving Participatory Democracy

Ella Baker's concept of participatory democracy reinforces earlier philosophers' theories about the benefits of grassroots participation. Aristotle and Alexis de Toqueville, two early political theorists, envisioned a government more responsive to its constituents' needs via citizens' active participation in decision-making processes. Cook writes in Participatory Democracy, "The idea that political participation can have an intrinsic as well as an instrumental value, that it can be an important factor in human growth and development, has often been ignored by modern "democratic elitists" who applaud the apathy and noninvolvement of ordinary people as essential for political stability" (Cook, p.7) It is often argued that a citizen's political efficacy matures with his sense of feeling involved in the governing processes. The citizen is likely to continue his political participation if he feels that he possesses the skills and characteristics necessary to initiate change in the status quo. Similarly, a citizen may engage in reform movement work if he believes two things: that he possesses the characteristics necessary to initiate change and secondly, that other participants within the movement desire his participation.

Baker's participatory democracy sparked individual citizens' participation in the reform movement by first providing citizens with the skills necessary to participate in the movement. The voter registration drives, literacy classes, sit-ins, and marches all contributed to participants' self-esteem and their perceptions about their self-worth, in particular their worth as citizens in a democracy. Baker did not envision accomplishing civil rights reform without educating all participants about what they could bring to the movement. Similarly, the Women's Movement embraced the concept of participatory democracy, believing too, that with heavy participation from the bottom rungs of society on up, citizens would be able to initiate greater reforms by understanding what

personal stock they would have in those future reforms, namely more rights and more educational and employment opportunities.

Neither the Civil Rights Movement nor the Women's Movement simply asked citizens to go to a voting booth and vote a particular way; each movement provided its participants with necessary skills that would empower these participants to have sustained involvement in politics. The greatest gift that participants received from the participatory democracy of both the Civil Rights Movement and the Women's Movement is their enhanced political efficacy, which later empowered them to participate in other notable reform movements such as the Welfare Reform Movement and the Gun Control Movement.

A Shared Call to Arms

During the beginning of the women's liberation movement, women were divided into two camps, a conservative camp and a radical camp, with the radical camp dominating the women's liberation movement. Women who had been involved in the Civil Rights Movement drifted towards the radical camp, using a myriad of the tactics employed in the earlier Civil Rights Movement to demonstrate for women's liberation. The radical wing of the Chicago Women's Group included a division called the Women's Radical Action Project which used sit-ins reminiscent of those used in the Civil Rights Movement to pursue women's liberation in 1969 (Hole and Levine, p. 115). Links between the Civil Rights Movement and the women's liberation movement attracted women to the women's movement who had formerly served in the Civil Rights Movement. Females participating in the Civil Rights Movement identified with the subjugation white females experienced from white males since they too had been treated as second-class citizens, inferior to both black and white males. A white, female participant in the Civil Rights Movement expressed the common second-class status shared by both white women and blacks when she spoke of her observations in Mississippi at the height of the Civil Rights Movement, saying that she learned from blacks that "I wasn't so free myself, and I began to worry about that" (Hole and Levine, p. 116).

Feminist scholars have traditionally concentrated on organizational structures within feminist organizations, often neglecting a study of the structural organization of groups not identifying themselves nominally as "feminist" organizations. A myriad of these organizations,

in particular the black women's organizations, often "employ feminist values, practices, and outcomes" (Barnett, p. 201). Scholars neglect the origins of participatory democracy when they study only nominal women's organization structures. The emphasis on participatory democracy that became the hallmark of the Civil Rights Movement began with black women's political activism. Black women organized at the grassroots level in their sororities, churches, and local branches of the National Association of Colored Women. While black women's experiences may be unique due to their dual oppression, as both blacks and females, scholars often overlook their experiences as women. Feminist scholars presently recognize the need to broaden the focus on women's organizational structures to all organizations employing feminist values, practices, and outcomes. Barnett's essay entitled, *Black Women's Collectivist Movement Organizations: Their Struggles during the Doldrums*, argues that black women's movement organizations, including those formed during the Civil Rights Movement, served as models for future white women's liberation organizations. Barnett writes that " the emphases on participatory democracy, community, collectivism, caring, mutual respect, and self-transformation that have been viewed as distinctive characteristics of White women's organizing in the late 1960's and 1970's" appeared in "Black women's political activism and organizing several decades later" (Barnett, p. 203). Feminist scholars view white women's refusal to acknowledge the black women's earlier contribution of participatory democracy to the Women's Liberation Movement as evidence of white women's inability to recognize the "diversity and multiplicity of women's experiences and women's consciousness" (Barnett, p. 203).

Black Women's Organization Structures

White female organization leaders failed to acknowledge the grievances originating from women of diverse racial backgrounds as well as fellow white females representing backgrounds contrasting with their own. The participatory democracy characterizing the Civil Rights Movement celebrated participation from African-American women drawn from all socio-economic and educational backgrounds. Although African-American women tended to join separate civil rights organizations comprised of women from their own social class, the movement included participation from a multitude of African-American women representing each segment of the African-American population. Poorer African-American women acquired the same grassroots leadership skills as affluent African-American women. The women's wing of the Civil Rights Movement included two groups, the Women's Political Council

(WPC), composed of middle-class and professional African-American women, and the "Club from Nowhere" (CFN), composed of poor, working-class African-American women. While the groups included significantly different populations of women, the organizational structures of each group promoted participatory democracy.

The operational structures and tactics employed by the African-American women belonging to the two most noteworthy female civil rights organizations, the WPC and CFN, adhere greatly to Ella Baker's definition of participatory democracy. Each group resisted too much hierarchical organization and embraced mass mobilization of resources at the grassroots level. Composed of mostly maids, housewives, and beauticians, members of the CFN organized at the local level by boycotting buses and walking to work. The more affluent WPC, composed of a membership including black professors, physicians, and lawyers, also engaged in the bus boycott along with poorer female organizers from the CFN. Other grassroots movement tactics employed by the WPC included voter registration drives, letter writing, and citizenship education and training (Barnett, p. 205).

Participatory Differences between White and Black Women's Organizations

White women denied black women the opportunity to participate in their political clubs and associations. White women's vision of participatory democracy ignored the root "dem," meaning all people, if those people happened to be black. Black women organized their civil rights organizations to fight racial segregation by Whites as well as gender segregation by black males. The permeability of class boundaries among women in the black community can be seen in the overlapping memberships of the black female activists. African-American women could often float between the varying groups; several women possessed membership in both the WPC and the CFN. With most of the activist work occurring in the churches, a sense of community easily developed that contributed to the overall nonhierarchical and democratic nature of the Civil Rights Movement. Empowerment is often cited as the greatest gift black women acquired from the nonhierarchical structure of the movement. All black women, including both the poor and the rich, developed a sense of self-confidence from the participatory democracy of the Civil Rights Movement that afforded them successes in future social movements, including the welfare movement of the 1960's, led mainly by poor, black women, and the women's liberation movement of the 1960's and 1970's.

The Separatist Element of the Women's Movement

White women's participatory democracy has a more separatist nature than the participatory democracy practices of African-American women. While several groups of white females organized in favor of women's liberation, the separate groups can best be characterized as fragmented factions that did not rally together with a united voice. In its infancy, the National Organization for Women (NOW) included mostly college-educated women and career women. A sample survey of NOW members taken in 1973 demonstrated that only seventeen percent of NOW members listed housewife as their primary occupation. Over sixty-percent of NOW's membership in 1973 had earned a college degree. Over thirty percent of its earliest members possessed advanced degrees (Freeman, p. 92). Among the problems experienced by the women's liberation organizations, due to their decentralized and fragmented organizational structure, were discrimination and political inefficacy. Those women who did not fit into NOW, either because of their lack of education, occupation, socio-economic status, or race, endured discrimination when they sought participation in NOW (Freeman, p. 128). Competing feminist groups like the Women's Equity Action League targeted diverse groups of people who did not subscribe to some of NOW's more radical ideas like the right to abortion, and in some cities the issue of lesbianism. Working women who had not earned college degrees felt more comfortable forming their own feminist organizations.

Unlike the African-American females, white women erected barriers within their own groups, barriers which precluded women from being able to penetrate into several groups. White women's feminist organizations encouraged grassroots involvement and lack of hierarchy within individual, fragmented groups of women, but Baker's idea of a participatory democracy, in which everyone could be empowered to mobilize for a given cause and be treated as an equal, did not prove true in the multitude of competing women's liberation organizations erected in the 1970's. Particularly, at a national level, these organizations could be extremely divisive, particularly about issues such as gay rights and abortion, as well as hierarchical, with established rules and elected leadership.

At its 1973 annual convention, NOW established a task force to address lesbianism and passed a resolution declaring that women have the right to develop their "full sexual potential"(Freeman, p. 99) Of the 600 women in attendance at the convention, very few wished to support

lesbianism, worrying that it would tarnish NOW's reputation, making NOW seem more radical. However, the lesbian resolution passed as a civil rights issue and a women's rights issue at the convention after three years of heated discussion among NOW members, especially between radical NOW members and moderate NOW members, who tended to be older than their college-age radical counterparts.

Structural Scenarios in the Women's Movement

Freeman describes NOW's problems as structural rather than ideological. The adoption of the lesbian resolution by members of NOW suggests that members with varying ideologies could suspend prejudices to come together for the common cause of promoting women's rights. However, structurally, NOW, as well as other women's organizations, faced what Freeman describes as the "classic dilemma" inherent to most social groups. NOW members struggled to maintain national coordination with grassroots participation. The hierarchical structure necessary for altering the women's social institutions conflicted with the concept of participatory democracy necessary for pursuing the "democratic nature" of NOW's goals (Freeman, p.100).

The "classic dilemma" women's groups faced can be explained by structural models proposed by Robert Michels in his book, Political Parties (Freeman, p. 100). Once an organization obtains some type of status in society, a centralized structure emerges. The bureaucrats have a vested interest in retaining their position in society, as well as the status of their organization, through the goals they set. Freeman speaks of the structure and lack of structure which encompass the "classic dilemma" as being a "curious protean medley of structure and spontaneity" (Freeman, p.101). The hierarchical structure and habit which classify bureaucratic organizations are not conducive to social movement organizations that lack financial resources for rewarding their membership and must utilize other incentives. Social movement organizations must attract membership by offering varying incentives, such as what Freeman terms "solidary" incentives, specifically friendship, respect, and prestige, and "purposive" incentives, such as the "value fulfillment," one's values are fulfilled by being in a specific social organization (Freeman, p.101). Freeman cites a social movement's primary resource as the "commitment of its members" (Freeman, p. 101). NOW's successes can be explained by its "solidary" and "purposive" incentives, both of which promoted participatory democracy's bottom- up leadership and resisted the hierarchical structure associated

with bureaucratic organizations.

"Purposive" and "Solidary" Incentives in the Civil Rights Movement

The same "purposive" and "solidary" incentives which characterized the participatory elements of the women's liberation movement also contributed to the democratic nature of the Civil Rights Movement. At the time that Ella Baker promoted the concept of participatory democracy, she used "purposive" and "solidary" incentives as means of encouraging her fellow citizens to join the social organizations behind the Civil Rights Movement. Churches served as one of the greatest democratic symbols behind the Civil Rights Movement, since they promoted the "purposive incentives" of getting involved. Through weekly meetings at the church, voter registration drives, and walks to work, African-Americans developed camaraderie and respect for each other. Freeman speaks of women initially being motivated to participate in the women's liberation movement by "solidary" incentives, in the form of friendship and respect, but later realizing the "purposive" and "value fulfillment" incentives once legislation had been passed and they understood the greatness and significance of having participated in the social organization. Similarly, most African-Americans joined the Civil Rights Movement unsure of whether their goals for freedom and additional rights would ever come into fruition. Only after the Civil Rights legislation passed did participants in the movement fully realize the purpose behind their participation.

Ideological Differences Among Separate Female Populations

Feminist scholar Jo Freeman states in her book, The Politics of Women's Liberation, that women's liberation groups suffered more from structural problems than ideological ones. Contrarily, Janet Flammang, author of Women's Political Voice, explains the gross differences in ideology possessed by women of varying backgrounds, that inhibited women of differing ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds from organizing together, as more divisive than structure. Diverse histories and privileges made it rather difficult for women of varying ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds to agree on a myriad of elements on the feminist agenda.

Following the Civil Rights Movement, African-American women faced the problem of having a dual identity, that of being a second-rate citizen as an African-American as well as a female . The dual jeopardy of

being black and being female did not permit black women to identify completely with either white women or black males. Black women faulted capitalism for oppressing the black population by forcing black men to work as low-wage, unskilled labor while black women worked in the kitchen for their white masters (Flammang, p. 331). At the conclusion of the Civil Rights Movement, black women took a different path from white females. They chose to help black males acquire the rights and privileges that had been denied to them for so long. Black women chose to form their own women's liberation organizations, so that they could engage in consciousness-raising sessions which acknowledged their dual identity, as members of two ostracized groups.

Even the black feminist organizations tended to be less separatist in their membership, therefore much more inclusive, than their white female counterparts' liberation organizations. In 1975, Jo Freeman reported that the National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO) membership was much more "heterogeneous than that of any other feminist organization, including women from a wide range of ages and occupations" (Flammang, p. 332). The National Black Feminist Organization's Statement of Purpose resented media portrayals that depicted the feminist movement as a white, middle-class females' movement. African-American feminists identified more with women from other minority groups than did white women. Alma M. Garcia cites four similarities that united African-American, Asian-American, and Chicana females. Among the chief reasons for an alliance among minority women was these groups' definition of feminism as a "struggle against the multidimensional inequality of race, class, and gender" (Flammang, p. 332).

Lower-Class Women's Dilemma

Similarly, lower-class white women participating in the liberation movement isolated themselves from middle-class participants, because they felt these women lacked empathy and understanding of their suffering. Lower-class women felt women's continuous analysis of their feelings was a luxury. They resisted white, middle-class women's efforts to assert that their education and skills resulted from their hard work. To lower-class women, white, middle-class women's successes resulted from their class privilege. To be able to build coalitions across class lines, middle-class women had to convince lower-class women that they shared the same privileges and skills (Flammang, p. 323). Only ten percent of lower-class working women strongly supported the women's liberation movement, insinu-

ating that white, middle-class women failed in their mission to demonstrate to their lower-class sisters the existing similarities between the two socio-economic groups. Working-class women resented many of the messages originating from the middle-class women defining the goals of the women's movement. They did not wish to be criticized for being married; nor did they appreciate the negative media images of female liberationists as "bra burners" and "man haters" (Flammang, p. 324). Most importantly, lower-class women did not feel that they lived in the type of privileged environment, inherent to white middle-class females, that would allow them to shed their traditional lifestyle as wives following the orders of their husbands. Lower-class women's ambivalence about their role in the home versus their ability to go out into the workplace during the day hampered their desire to join the women's liberation movement.

Conclusion

Clearly, participatory democracy played a paramount role in both the Civil Rights Movement and the second wave of the Women's Movement. Female activists in the Civil Rights Movement, including both white and black women, transferred the participatory nature of their social movement to the women's movement, making participatory democracy a theme of both movements. However, differences in ideology among the myriad of diverse groups of females participating in the Women's Movement triggered the formation of varying organizational structures among the many groups. Some groups, such as the minorities' liberation groups, like the National Black Feminist Organization, better reflected the organizational structure of bottom-up leadership promoted by Ella Baker during the Civil Rights Movement, while groups such as the National Organization for Women struggled to not create bureaucratic organizations at the national level that promoted hierarchical leadership over grassroots leadership. The separatist nature of the Women's Movement can be attributed to the multitude of diverse groups of females, from females of different ethnic and racial backgrounds to women of different socio-economic strata, encompassing this one movement. Elements of participatory democracy appear within each enclave of women encompassing the greater Women's Movement. Therefore, the participatory democracy which served as the bridge connecting the Civil Rights Movement to the second wave of the Women's Movement must be acknowledged as Civil Rights Movement's greatest contribution to the Women's Movement.

Annotated Bibliography

Barnett, Bernice McNair. *Black Women's Collectivist Movement Organizations*. In Feminist Organizations. 1995. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Barnett's article in Myra Marx Ferree's book, Feminist Organizations, defines the ideologies and structures of two influential black women's organizations. This article explains the great extent of black women's participation in the Civil Rights Movement by comparing and contrasting the objectives and characteristics of two distinct groups of black women, affluent black women and low income black women, who organized at the grassroots level to push civil rights, as well as some women's issues. Just as Janet Flammang's book, Women's Political Voice, dedicates attention to the different socio-economic factions of white females pushing for women's liberation in the 1970's, Barnett's article, "Black Women's Collectivist Movement Organizations," addresses how black women belonging to contrasting socio-economic groups embraced the concept of participatory democracy. Both Flammang and Barnett's work demonstrate the separatist, although democratic nature, that pervaded both the Civil Rights Movement and the Women's Liberation Movement encouraging women to unite with other women whose ideologies and backgrounds more closely mirrored their own.

Cook, Terrence E. Participatory Democracy. 1971. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

Cook, a social scientist, has written Participatory Democracy, a book about democracy, with the intention of answering one central question. He wishes to know if participation should be expanded to acquire more democracy. Cook explains that "participatory democracy" should concern everyone, from those in the courts to those in the streets. As Cook writes this book, he acknowledges that a debate is in progress on the prospects of "participatory democracy," and hopes his book will initiate a starting point for everyone to participate in this dialogue. Cook defines "participatory democracy" as power from the bottom-up, much like other authors included in this annotated bibliography have done, in particular Mueller, Grant, and Kocks. Cook's dialogue about "participatory democracy" differs from these authors' dialogues since his does not only focus on its usage in one movement or one country. Cook examines a myriad of social movements in diverse countries as he both describes and argues the merits of "participatory democracy." Cook's book proves fruitful to this research topic because he too focuses on groups within the Civil Rights Movement who believed in "participatory democracy." In addition to focusing on one social movement of interest and how it employed "participatory democracy," he allows for his readers to formulate comparisons of "participatory democracy's" usage across several political and social movements. Since this research aims to judge to what effect tactics employed throughout one social movement contributed to the success of another, Cook's cross references in Participatory Democracy to several movements will encourage direct comparisons between the two movements being studied in this research, namely the Civil Rights Movement and the second wave of the Women's Movement, defined as the Women's Movement post-Civil Rights era.

Flammang, Janet A. Women's Political Voice. 1997. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Flammang, a leading feminist scholar, challenges the democratic nature of the Women's Movement. In Women's Political Voice, she explains the difficulties that women originating from diverse socio-economic and racial backgrounds endured when trying to define their ideologies in a social movement defined by privileged, white women who could not relate to their groups' suffering as well as their disparate ideologies. Flammang's work highlights the separatist nature of the Women's Movement. Unlike the Civil Rights Movement, in which most participants had at least endured the hardship of racism together, white women came from different places and sought bonds with women whose backgrounds most closely resembled their own. Flammang's work allows one to see fragmented participatory democracy, when analyzing the organizational structures and ideologies of the varying feminist groups under the umbrella of the Women's Movement, while also drawing significant distinctions between the structures and ideologies present in the Civil Rights Movement and those at work in the Women's Movement.

Freeman, Jo. The Politics of Women's Liberation. 1975. New York: David McKay Company, Inc.

Freeman is a renowned feminist scholar who participated in the Women's Liberation Movement. Her works such as The Second Wave and The Tyranny of Structureless are often cited by the following authors as contributing significantly to their research of the second wave of the Women's Movement. In The Politics of Women's Liberation, Freeman explains the "classic dilemma" of the women's movement as being a conflict between bureaucratic, hierarchical national governing structures and democratic grassroots structures. Freeman uses the model of political scientists Weber and Michels to explain the bureaucratic governing structure which often threatens the democratic component, namely the use of participatory democracy, in social movements. Incentives that accompany social movement participation can be classified into three groups: purposive, value-fulfillment, and solidary. Freeman's attention to these incentives, which historically affect social movements by encouraging people's participation in these movements, sheds light on the "participatory" democratic nature of the women's movement which motivated a myriad of diverse women to join the movement.

Grant, Joanne. Ella Baker: Freedom Bound. 1998. New York: Wiley and Sons.

Grant became acquainted with Ella Baker in 1960 at the founding conference of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, an organization to which both women served as co-workers for several years. Grant's Freedom Bound serves as a tribute to the bottom-up organization of the Civil Rights Movement that Ella arduously promoted. Grant aims to shed historians' past convictions of the leadership behind Civil Rights as the work of a few heroes. Grant uses Ella Baker's personal story to explain the bottom-up leadership that made the Civil Rights Movement such a success. With discussion of Ella's opinions of the Civil Rights Movement, Grant demonstrates the ideals behind the concept of "participatory democracy" as ideals that both alienated Baker from the movement's celebrated leadership and spurred the movement's success. Grant defines Ella's concept of "participatory democracy" by highlighting events in Baker's life and her responses to them, in particular her strained relationship with Dr. Martin Luther, King. Jr., who she felt inhibited grassroots involvement. While Mueller, another annotated author, provides a short definition of "participatory democracy" with few examples of its occurrence, Grant's Freedom Bound repeatedly highlights examples of "participatory democracy." These additional examples of "participatory democracy" allow for greater understanding of the origin of the popular tactics that later appear in the second wave of the Women's Movement.

Hartmann, Susan M. From Margin to Mainstream: American Women and Politics Since 1960. 1996. McGraw-Hill.

Hartmann uses From Margin to Mainstream to contribute to a series of books entitled *Critical Episodes in American Politics* designed to illuminate significant periods throughout American history. Hartmann's literary audience includes students studying the evolution of women's political involvement. The beginning of Hartmann's book focuses on the events of the Civil Rights Movement, including particular attention directed at Ella Baker and her mobilization of activists at the grassroots level during the Movement. Following Hartmann's discussion of Civil Rights, Hartmann addresses the second wave of the women's movement which piggy-backed off the Civil Rights Movement. Woven into the threads of the second wave of the Women's Movement are threads of the Civil Rights Movement, including specific elements of "participatory democracy" that are described by Mueller, another author included in this annotated bibliography. Hartmann's From Margin to Mainstream demonstrates just how the Women's Movement piggy-backed off the Civil Rights Movement by adopting similar tactics, such as the grassroots involvement, picketing, and sit-ins that during Ella Baker's time were examples of "participatory democracy."

Hole, Judith and Levine, Ellen. Rebirth of Feminism. 1971. New York: Quadrangle Books Inc.

Hole and Levine's Rebirth of Feminism links the Civil Rights Movement with the Women's Movement by discussing the infusion of Civil Rights Movement participatory democracy nto the Women's Movement, early on through female black and white activists who participated in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee during the Civil Rights Movement and later helped

initiate the Women's Movement. Hole and Levine allude to the black women's "dual jeopardy" identity i that Flammang discusses in her book, Women's Political Voice. Hole and Levine address how during the Civil Rights Movement black women realized their abilities and capabilities in such a way that they broke off into consciousness raising groups and discussed society's ill treatment of them as not only members of a second-class race but as members of a second-class gender group. The second chapter of Hole and Levine's book confirms the existence of the participatory democracy practices which Grant's earlier mentioned biography explains as characterizing the Civil Rights Movement.

Kocks, Dorothee K. *Acting Locally, Thinking Globally: Ella Baker and a Politics of Identifying*. In Dream a Little: Land and Social Justice in Modern America. 2000. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kocks, a professor at the University of Utah, uses landscapes to elaborate Americans' dreams for social justice. Kocks' Dream a Little examines geographic locations that encourage these dreams including the West, family farms, and the local community. Ella Baker symbolizes the great role local communities play in a democracy. Kocks describes Baker as a "localist," someone who developed a philosophy of community that beginning with the location of the people. Baker's distrust for big government and devotion to local politics as a setting in which to promote democratic ideals are the cornerstones of "participatory democracy." Kocks emphasizes Baker's contributions to democracy in a chapter entitled "Acting Globally, Thinking Locally." Kocks' description of Ella Baker's contribution elaborates on the descriptions offered by annotated authors Mueller and Grant. Kocks' chapter on Ella Baker provides more examples of tactics Baker used throughout the Civil Rights Movement to achieve equality, tactics whose presence in the second wave of the Women's Movement may become more visible following an understanding of Kocks more elaborated description of Baker's employment of "participatory democracy."

Mueller, Carol. *Ella Baker and the Roots of Participatory Democracy*. In Women in the Civil Rights Movement. 1990. New York: Carlson Publishing. pp. 51-70.

Mueller defines "participatory democracy" as a fusion of ideas emphasizing political involvement and organization at the grass-roots level, absence of one solid leader or hierarchical structure, and a call for direct action as a result of fear and alienation. Mueller attempts to convince students of Civil Rights history that participatory democracy did not originate with the student leaders in the Students for a Democratic Society. She argues that Ella Baker first articulated the concept of "participatory democracy," with later Civil Rights participants, including the students, adopting the same concept. Mueller's work provides both the definition and origin of the "participatory democracy" which contributed to the success of the Civil Rights Movement. By examining the elements of Baker's "participatory democracy," it becomes possible to understand to what extent grassroots involvement and mobilization in later social movements, such as the Women's Movement, either deviated or conformed to Baker's definition of "participatory democracy."

Polletta, Francesca. Freedom is an Endless Meeting. 2002. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Polletta, a professor of sociology at Columbia University, focuses on both the Civil Rights Movement and the second wave of the Women's Movement as she examines the role democratic ideals play in social movements. Like Mueller, another annotated author, Polletta does provide a description of "participatory democracy." However, Polletta's definition reflects the definition formulated by white members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee with less emphasis on Ella Baker's involvement in the formulation of the definition. Polletta's examples of women's massive participation in the Women's Movement highlight the significant impact the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee's definition of "participatory democracy" had on the organization of future Women's Movement groups. Like the Civil Rights Movement, women promote equality among each other by discouraging one-spokesman leadership. Polletta's book has great meaning to this research project because it really demonstrates how the Women's Movement piggy-backed off of the Civil Rights Movement through its incorporation of a myriad of organizational ideas that originated from the Civil Rights Movement.

Conceptualizing the Mustard Seed of Democracy

DAVID P. DORÈ
Justice, Law and Society

Abstract

Charles Van Doren, in *A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future*, identifies "the triumph of democracy"[1] as one of the defining characteristics of the 20th Century. He assuredly predicts that even China will succumb to the wave of democracy.[2] He tells the story of how in 1989 dissidents proudly erected a replica of the Statute of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. While it was subsequently pulverized by the authorities, the visionary gesture and "the hope that the statute symbolized…was not."[3] Van Doren and his mentor, the philosopher Mortimer Adler, further argue "democracy is the only perfectly just form of government."[4] That is a sweeping statement, and it is one that we will not attempt to digest in this brief study of democracy.

Although we will not wrestle with the "justness" of democracy, we do hope to examine Van Doren's point regarding the proliferation of democracies in the 20th Century. Why have 120 countries,[5] or more specifically the citizens[6] of those countries, chosen democracy over authoritarian rule? How did these disparate states[7] start the difficult transition towards democracy? Once nation-states have decided to move in the direction of democratic rule, how do they, vis-à-vis procedures, institutions and people, strengthen the chosen governance model? In short, this paper attempts to elucidate governance theories that address those important questions, and to recognize the *dynamism* therein.

This paper also sketches specific factors that facilitate a country's movement towards democratic consolidation. It maintains that not only is there a hierarchy of factors that foster the emergence and solidifying of democratic rule, but that there is also a horizontal component between the stakeholders, namely academics, practitioners, and government officials. The difficulty, of course, is identifying the precise association (along a casual-correlative continuum) between the factors and the faces in democratic

governance. This discernment is critical because as Kofi Annan comments, "Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development."[8] While we will not draw out R^2 values and loading factors, we do hope to broaden the discourse within the School of Public Affairs by analyzing democratic governance to understand better the relationship between justice, law, and society.

> I can conceive of a society in which all men would feel an equal love and respect for the laws of which they consider themselves the authors; in which the authority of the government would be respected as necessary, and not divine; and in which the loyalty of the subject to the chief magistrate would not be a passion, but a quiet and rational persuasion. With every individual in the possession of rights which he is sure to retain, a kind of manly confidence and reciprocal courtesy would arise between all classes, removed alike from pride and servility. The people, well acquainted with their own true interests, would understand that, in order to profit from the advantages of the state, it is necessary to satisfy its requirements. The voluntary association of the citizens might then take the place of the individual authority of the nobles, and the community would be protected from tyranny and license. — Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, The Author's Preface

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Introduction

Charles Van Doren, in *A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future*, identifies "the triumph of democracy"[9] as one of the defining characteristics of the 20th Century. He assuredly predicts that even China will succumb to the wave of democracy.[10] He tells the story of how in 1989 dissidents proudly erected a replica of the Statute of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. While it was subsequently pulverized by the authorities, the visionary gesture and "the hope that the statute symbolized…was not."[11] Van Doren and his mentor, the philosopher Mortimer Adler, further argue "democracy is the only perfectly just form of government."[12] That is a sweeping statement, and it is one that we will not attempt to digest in this brief study of democracy.

Although we will not wrestle with the "justness" of democracy, we do hope to examine Van Doren's point regarding the proliferation of democracies in the 20th Century. Why have 120 countries,"[13] or more specifically the citizens[14] of those countries, chosen democracy over authoritarian rule? How did these disparate states[15] start the difficult transition towards democracy? Once nation-states have decided to move in the direction of democratic rule, how do they, vis-à-vis procedures, institutions and people, strengthen the chosen governance model? In short, this paper attempts to

elucidate governance theories that address those important questions, and to recognize the *dynamism* therein (See Figure 1).

This paper also sketches factors that facilitate a country's movement towards consolidating democracy. It maintains that not only is there a hierarchy of factors that fosters the emergence and solidifying of democratic rule, but that there is also a horizontal component between the stakeholders, namely academics, practitioners, and government officials. The difficulty, of course, is identifying the precise association (along a casual-correlative continuum) between the factors and the faces in democratic governance. This discernment is critical because as Kofi Annan comments, "Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development."[16] While we will not draw out R^2 values and loading factors, we do hope to broaden the discourse within the School of Public Affairs by analyzing democratic governance to understand better the relationship between justice, law, and society.

Concepts

Democracy

Before discussing the factors that may influence whether democratic rule takes root in a country, we first need to lay a conceptual foundation by defining key terms. Like Robert Dahl, we posit that there are no true democracies in the world today. In fact, we argue that democracies and consolidated democracies are unattainable. Instead, we should focus on their relational terms, meaning their proximity to authoritarian rule, in the case of transitional democracies, and democratic rule, in the case of consolidating democracies (See Figure 1). Thus, we describe democracy, borrowing from President Lincoln's 1863 Gettysburg Address, as a political system "of the people, by the people, for the people." Furthermore, it is a human system that judiciously balances societal interests with individual ones vis-à-vis popular laws and civil society that function in: (1) social control; (2) dispute settlement; and (3) social change.[17]

Other governance theorists have been much more rigorous, and we daresay constricting, in their characterization of what democracy is. There are four competing and, at the same time, complementary definitions of democracy that we should unpack. First, Seymour Lipset, in his seminal 1959 article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," discusses democracy as "a politi-

cal system…[with] regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. A social mechanism…among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part…to [exercise] influence [by being able] to choose among alternative contenders for political office."[18] Institutions, such as elections, figure prominently in this definition.

Second, Barrington Moore concentrates on the "development of a democracy" as a means to control the "rules" and the "rulers"; moreover, in his oft-cited expression, "No bourgeoisie, no democracy…," he develops Lipset's analysis, albeit from a grassroots perspective, that economic development is a requisite for democracy by noting the importance of a middle, entrepreneurial class.[19] Arguing from a conflict perspective, Moore views "law [as] a tool by which the ruling class exercises its control…that protects the property of those in power and serves to repress political threats to the position of the elite."[20]

In our third example, Dahl underscores "the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals,"[21] as a key feature of a democracy. As mentioned above, Dahl further cautions that there are no true democracies in the world today. Instead, polyarchies dot the earth. These exhibit three vital characteristics: (1) "political competition" with associational groups, including political parties, i.e. the Labor and Tory parties in United Kingdom, freely vying for positions of governing power; (2) "participation" by adults in "free and fair" elections such that selected adults are not denied the right to vote, as was the case in every national jurisdiction in 1900[22]; and (3) "civil and political liberties"[23] that bolster the other two components.[24] Similar to Lipset, this definition focuses upon institutions, including political parties and elections. Given Dahl's criteria, it would be interesting to access whether democratically elected officials worldwide are, in fact, being responsive to their constituent's preferences as to how best to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions seeking to disarm Iraq.[25]

Writing twenty years after Dahl, Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl give us a fourth account of what democracy is. They assert: "Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives."[26] Accountability is at the crux of this particular definition, as well as a certain distance between citizens and the rulers.

Indubitably, governance theorists consider voting as the *sine qua non* of democratic theory. In fact, much attention has been given to voting as a necessary, albeit insufficient, mechanism for organizing a democratic society.[27] One that has a political system with a republican institutional framework: the people, *demos*, vote for their elected officials to articulate their interests. Elections, in turn, are the fulcrum on which everything seemingly rests. Direct democracy typified in Ancient Athens is replaced with indirect democracy that, frankly, lessens the people's engagement in the public good. A primary reason for this reliance upon elected officials is that society has become, over millennia, more fractured and specialized. Citizens just do not have the time (nor the stomach!) to spend in the public sphere; in Rousseau's terms, they entrust leaders in a contractual relationship[28] to realize their interests through peaceful means.

Transition

Of course, there are nation-states that are quite removed from our notions of democracy. China's governance model, for instance, is an example of the Dahlian "closed hegemony" because it lacks neither "inclusiveness" in terms of participation in the political realm nor "liberalization" in terms "permissible opposition."[29] But surely China is more open and concomitantly less repressive than in years past. Has it quietly entered the transition to democracy?

The concept of transition or, as Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter maintain, "the interval between one political regime and another"[30] is critical to our understanding of the seed of democracy. Given that the transition is an interval, one would expect a continuum with definable end points. While the judicious identification of the start of a transition is much more art than science, "the typical sign that the transition has begun comes when these authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reason, begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups."[31] The impetus for this modification may take many forms.

For instance, when the military realizes its power is all but collapsed, it may negotiate extracting pacts[32] with the incoming civilian government before it abdicates. It may fear possible prosecution for human rights violations, or it may want a role in the new government. As a result, the military may offer concessions to secure a place and, more importantly, a voice in the nascent government. Although these agreements are not

"necessary features of a successful transition,…they can play an important role in any regime change based on gradual installment rather than a dramatic event."[33] Pacts are also important because they rely upon trust to a large degree, and trust grounds the human relationship necessary in democratic governance.[34]

A dramatic event, such as the unexpected death of a charismatic, albeit despotic, leader, may also usher in a transitional government. Reflecting on Nigeria's experience, soon after General Sani Abacha's death in 1998, his successor General Abubakar announced elections and a handover of power to civilian rule within nine months.[35] While Abacha's death or Abubakar's announcement may (or may not) be *the* starting point for democratic rule, the calling for elections and the subsequent capacity-building by the Transitional Monitoring Group, an umbrella group consisting of over sixty issue-oriented civil society groups (human rights, health care, juvenile, prison, etc.), symbolized an important step forward. Indeed, the elections were emblematic, if not substantive, of Nigeria throwing off the yoke of authoritarian rule. But the question then becomes, where is Nigeria in its transition? O'Donnell and Schmitter describe two additional phases within the transitional period: (1) "liberalization," or "the process of redefining and extending rights" and (2) "democratization," that enables citizenship to deepen, both in terms of the responsibilities of the rulers and the ruled.[36] Thus, Nigeria falls in the liberalization stage of transition because they are still in the process of writing a new constitution aimed at better articulating the rights of Nigerian citizenry.[37]

Given the inherent difficulty in determining the actual start of a transition, we may examine, on a broader scale, Dankwart Rustow's three phases (preparatory, decision, and habituation) in transitions to democracy. He cautions: "The factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis."[38] Before a nation-state can realistically move in the direction of democracy, it must have national unity. This does not mean national debate as to the country's policies, procedures, and institutions is silenced or there is a forced unanimity. Rather, "it simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to."[39] For instance, the deep ethnic (Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomans), religious (Shi'ite and Sunni) and tribal (Shammar, Dhafir and al-Dhulaimi) divisions in Iraq will constitute a major challenge in building a stable and pluralistic post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Indeed, "the challenges of recon-

structing Iraq's political order – either by peaceful transition or after a bloody confrontation - are immensely more complex than is usually acknowledged."[40]

Only after a country has established national unity, can it move through the three phases of preparation, decision-making, and habituation. Preparation involves "the emergence of a new elite" class.[41] Utilizing Iraq as a case study, if the new elites and elected officials are solely from the exiled community, such as the Iraqi National Congress, then ordinary Iraqis who have been living in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party will be ambivalent, on the one hand, and suspicious, on the other. Decision-making entails "the deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and…to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure."[42] In this phase we would find the proliferation and strengthening of institutions, including a well-functioning tax collection agency. Habituation occurs when democracy becomes, to use the parlance of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "the only game in town" and the "contending political forces…submit other major questions to resolution by democratic procedures."[43] In essence, the compromises necessary for the nonviolent resolution of conflict become familiar and routine, encouraging more of the same.

Consolidation

As noted previously, there is a continuum that includes transitional and consolidating components to the realization of democracy. And before moving to the factors and faces that may contribute to a transitional and consolidating government, let us articulate what we mean by consolidation. As its etymology suggests, consolidation intimates the transitional democracy has sufficiently solidified and strengthened. What signifies this movement?

We will note two plausible explanations. In *The Third Wave* Huntington offers, on the one hand, a rather parsimonious test to access whether a country is consolidated. He argues that a state is democratically consolidated when: (1) "the initial election winner loses and turns over power peacefully (2) this happens again."[44] Take Mexico as an example: In 2000 the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) candidate Vincente Fox ousted the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) candidate Francisco Labastida. In fact, "Fox's election as Mexico's 62nd President marked the first peaceful handover of power to the political opposition in 179 years since indep-

endence and the end of 71 years of PRI rule."[45] Still, according to the "two turnover test," Mexico is not consolidated because President Fox has not lost an election.

On the other hand, Linz and Stepan view consolidation as "a complex system of institutions, rules and patterned incentives and discentives has become, in a phrase, 'the only game in town'."[46] They sharpen this definition to include:

> *Behaviorally*,…when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. *Attitudinally*, …when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from prodemocratic forces. *Constitutionally*,…when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.[47]

Using this ternate delineation, the United States was far from consolidated even after the Civil War (1861-1865). Indeed, we maintain that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, signed into law by Lyndon Baines Johnson, represented a historic juncture in American democratic governance because it represented, for the first time, a de jure and de facto commitment to universal suffrage. It is important to note as well the fluidity associated with the move to democratic consolidation. Linz and Stepan make this point when they talk about Chile in 1996. It held free popular elections but the institutional framework was so constricted by the outgoing military, i.e. a set number of military officials in National Assembly, that although the transition was completed, consolidation was stymied.[48]

A consolidated democracy, reason Linz and Stepan, is also bolstered by a symbiotic relationship between "civil society" and "political society," as well as the "rule of law…state bureaucracy…[and] institutionalized economic society."[49] For this study, civil society consists of any non-profit and for-profit organization, including nongovernmental organizations, media, and business. Meanwhile, political society rests upon institutions, such as "political parties, legislatures, [and] elections."[50] While relying upon the "rule of law animated by a spirit of constitutionalism,"[51]

democracy also flourishes under an economic society that has degrees of a market economy and a command economy[52] that uses a Webian bureaucracy.[53] Let us now turn briefly to the factors and faces that may foster democratic transition and consolidation.

Soil, Water and Sun

Facilitating Conditions and Actions to Democracy

There are two main types of factors that enable countries to transition and consolidate democratically. The first consists of conditions, such as structural features (cultural, class, geographical), that each society and, equally important, each individual encounter. Colonial vestige is also included in this category—with the length and nationality of the occupying power of interest to social scientists.[54] Conditions are inherently resistant to change as Putnam finds in his influential book *Making Democracy Work*. During the study of regional institutional performance in Italy from 1970 to 1989, he and his colleagues found that civic community (or lack thereof) lies at the center of whether a region is effective and responsive, two critical components of a democracy.[55]

The second factor includes the actions of individuals and, at a different level, the actions of countries or even the international community as a whole. For instance, in 1994 United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 authorized the use of force in order to return Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power.[56] While testing the influence of economic development on democratic tendencies as hypothesized by Lipset,[57] Adam Prezeworkski and Fernando Limongi adumbrate this distinction and conclude that democracy "is not a by-product of economic development [rather] it can be initiated at any level of development."[58]

We agree with this analysis and argue further that the actions and choices of leaders are especially salient in a transitioning democracy. Pointedly, do the leaders really want democracy? Machiavelli scrutinized leadership and identified two complementary aspects of political adroitness, namely virtú and fortuna.[59] The former is the toolbox of talents (oratory, intellectual, social) that a leader possesses, while the latter suggests, for lack of a better phrase, "being in the right place at the right time." It is this fortuitous combination that is the sinew of exceptional leaders.

For our discussion on democratic transition and the movement to-

wards consolidation, we may study Nelson Mandela as the exemplar of leadership. In South Africa a cogent reason for the relatively peaceful transfer of power between the outgoing National Party and the incoming African National Congress was Mandela's "accommodationist policies…that celebrate[d] diversity, consult[ed] with all politically significant elites, and include[d] his political adversaries in government post."[60] What makes Mandela's example even more inspiring is the fact that he wanted a "consensus-based government"[61] with the same people who had imprisoned him for twenty-seven years, eighteen of those on Robben's Island.[62]

By this sustained attention to leadership, we do not mean to suggest there are not important conditions that support democracy. Rather, the seed of democracy will germinate, it is argued, only if there is a healthy combination of rich, fertile soil (the conditions mentioned above), water (the actions of leaders and societies committed to democratic ideals, such as equality under the law), and the sun (the participation of the people at the local level). Thus, this paper's simplistic definition of democracy of, by and for the people rings hollow if the people do not actively support it.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to examine the seed of democracy by drawing key definitions, such as democracy, transition, and consolidation. Among the descriptions of democracy, Lipset and Dahl articulate institutional definitions, meaning institutions, such as elections, figure prominently in democratic theory. Moore offers a Marxian perspective that places the class struggle between the ruler and the ruled at the core of democratic development, while Schmitter and Karl stress the accountability of the rulers by the citizens. A certain palpable distance develops between citizens and the rulers, a notion that runs counter to the (imperfect!) direct democracy found in Ancient Athens.

In discussing transition and consolidation, we have also emphasized the dynamism associated with these terms, meaning their proximity to authoritarian rule, in the case of transitional democracies, and democratic rule, in the case of consolidating democracies. Recognizing the inherent difficulty in identifying where and when the transitional phase stops and the consolidating phase starts, we nonetheless defined transition as the interval between one political regime and another. Consolidation, as suggested by Linz and Stepan, represents the development and strengthening of five arenas: civil society, political society, rule of law, bureaucracy, and

an economic society.

Finally, we adumbrated factors that may foster the democratic transitioning and consolidating of a state. We divided these factors into two components, namely conditions and actions. Here again, we may describe these elements in terms of their kinetic energy.[63] The former therefore represents the fertile ground in which the seed of democracy may grow, while the latter is the flowing water that enables not only the germination of the seed but also its transcendent flourishing.

This study hopefully has raised far more questions than answers. In this sense, we are reminded of Socrates as a midwife of knowledge in *Theatetus*:

> The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend the travails of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with me it is different.[64]

Philosophy aside, we shall borrow from de Toqueville and "conceive of a society in which all men would feel an equal love and respect for the laws of which they consider themselves the authors; in which the authority of the government would be respected as necessary, and not divine; and in which the loyalty of the subject to the chief magistrate would not be a passion, but a quiet and rational persuasion."[65] Justice, law, and society are therefore critical as each mustard seed of democracy takes its inimitable shape.

Figure 1



"Democracy"

Authoritarian Rule
⇳
Transitioning Democracy
⇳
Consolidating Democracy
⇩
Consolidated Democracy

Table 1

	Sovereign States and Colonial Units			Population (millions)		
	2000	1950	1900	2000	1950	1900
DEM	120 (62.5%)	22 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	3,439.4 (58.2%)	743.2 (31.0%)	0 (0.0%)
RDP	16 (8.3%)	21 (13.6%)	25 (19.2%)	297.6 (5.0%)	285.9 (11.9%)	206.6 (12.4%)
CM	0 (0.0%)	9 (5.8%)	19 (14.6%)	0 (0.0%)	77.9 (3.2%)	299.3 (17.9%)
TM	10 (5.2%)	4 (2.6%)	6 (4.6%)	58.2 (1.0%)	16.4 (0.7%)	22.5 (1.3%)
AM	0 (0.0%)	2 (1.3%)	5 (3.8%)	0 (0.0%)	12.5 (0.5%)	610.0 (36.6%)
AR	39 (20.3%)	10 (6.5%)	0 (0.0%)	1,967.7 (33.3%)	122.0 (5.1%)	0 (0.0%)
TOT	5 (2.6%)	12 (7.8%)	0 (0.0%)	141.9 (2.4%)	816.7 (34.1%)	0 (0.0%)
C	0 (0.0%)	43 (27.9%)	55 (42.3%)	0 (0.0%)	118.4 (4.9%)	503.1 (30.2%)
P	2 (1.0%)	31 (20.1%)	20 (15.4%)	4.8 (0.1%)	203.3 (8.5%)	26.5 (1.6%)
TOTAL	192 (100.0%)	154 (100.0%)	130 (100.0%)	5,909.6 (100.0%)	2,396.3 (100.0%)	1,668.0 (100.0%)

DEM = Democracy

RDP = Restricted Democratic Practice

CM = Constitutional Monarchy

TM = Traditional Monarchy

AM = Absolute Monarchy

AR = Authoritarian Regime

TOT = Totalitarian Regime

C = Colonial Dependency

P = Protectorate

Source: Freedom House. 1999. *Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century* <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html#table3>

Endnotes

[1] See Van Doren, Charles. 1991. *A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Ballantine Books, in particular Chapter 12.
[2] We borrow from S.P. Huntington's analogy in *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
[3] Van Doren. 1991, 299.
[4] Ibid., 303-304.
[5] According to Freedom House, this figure represents 62.5% of the 192 independent and colonial units worldwide. Interestingly, this figures corresponds to over 3.4 billion people now living under democracy. See Table 1 for more information. Freedom House. 1999. *Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century* <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html#table3>
[6] See Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Karl. "What Democracy Is…and Is Not." *Journal of Democracy* (Summer 1991): 77. They view citizens as "the most distinctive element in democracies." What constitutes citizenship? For example, does a prisoner enjoy the status of citizen? If so, is it right and fair for jurisdictions to take the right to vote away from convicted felons or those incarcerated?
[7] We use nation-states, states, and countries interchangeably.
[8] Annan, Kofi. *UNDP Thematic Trust Fund: Democratic Governance*. United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Development Policy <http://www.undp.org/trustfunds/devgovttf.pdf>
[9] See Van Doren, Charles. 1991. *A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Ballantine Books, in particular Chapter 12.
[10] We borrow from S.P. Huntington's analogy in *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
[11] Van Doren. 1991, 299.
[12] Ibid., 303-304.
[13] According to Freedom House, this figure represents 62.5% of the 192 independent and colonial units worldwide. Interestingly, this figures corresponds to over 3.4 billion people now living under democracy. See Table 1 for more information. Freedom House. 1999. *Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html#table3>
[14] See Schmitter Philippe and Terry Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is…and Is Not." *Journal of Democracy* (Summer):77. They view citizens as "the most distinctive element in democracies." What constitutes citizenship? For example, does a prisoner enjoy the status of citizen? If so, is it right and fair for jurisdictions to take the right to vote away from convicted felons or those incarcerated?
[15] We use nation-states, states, and countries interchangeably.
[16] Annan, Kofi. *UNDP Thematic Trust Fund: Democratic Governance.* United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Development Policy <http://www.undp.org/trustfunds/devgovttf.pdf>
[17] For an overview of law's function in society, see Vago, Steven. 2003. *Law and Society*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 18-21.
[18] Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* (March): 71.
[19] Moore, Jr. Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy*. Boston, 414.
[20] Vago, 25.
[21] Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participant and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1.
[22] Freedom House. 1999. *Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century* <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html#table3>
[23] For a legalistic articulation on these rights, see the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm>
[24] Dahl, 6-7.

[25] Following Dahl's definition, meta-analysis focused on public opinion polls worldwide as to this salient question may shed light on the thickness of democracy by country, region, and the world. We know of no such study.
[26] Schmitter and Karl, 76.

[27] We concomitantly recognize the widespread, if not near unanimity, belief that voting, per se, is a necessary procedure in a democratic governance model. We view voting, however, not as a panacea but as a placebo. See Arrow, Kenneth. 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare." *The Journal of Political Economy*. (August): 328-346. In describing what is now known as Arrow's Possibility Theorem, he proves that no voting system is perfect, thus calling into question the basis of republican democracy.

[28]See Rousseau, Jean-Jacque. 1967. *The Social Contract.* (Edited by Cole.) London: J.M. Dent. (Originally published in 1762) For an examination of Rousseau and his thought, see Melzer, Arthur M. 1990. *The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[29] Dahl, 4.
[30] O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter. 1989. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 6.
[31] O'Donnell and Schmitter, 6.
[32] O'Donnell and Schmitter, 37
[33] Ibid., 37.
[34] See Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam spends considerable attention throughout his book to "trust" and its importance in fostering institutional performance.
[35] For a unique perspective on the Nigerian transition, see Nwanko, Clement. 1999. "Monitoring Nigeria's Elections." *Journal of Democracy*. (October). Nwanko was chair of the Transitional Monitoring Group. The TMG was responsible for observing elections, this particular field report explores the TMG's experience leading up to and during local, state, and national elections.
[36] O'Donnell and Schmitter, 7-8
[37] See Avuru, "Why Amend the Constitution?" *Africa News*. October 29, 2002 Tuesday <Lexis-Nexis>
[38] Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 2 No. 3: 346.
[39] Ibid., 350.
[40] To be sure, given the repressive regime of the Ba'ath Party, consisting primarily of minority Sunni, Shi'ite reprisals is widely feared. See Evans, Gareth. Press Release, **"**Iraq: What Lies Beneath Implications for International Decision-Making," October 1, 2002. **<**http://www.intl-crisis group.org/projects/middleeast/iraq_iran_gulf/reports/A400786_01102002.pdf> Evans is the International Crisis Group President. ICG is an independent, multinational organization that investigates conflict areas throughout the world.
[41] Rustow, 352.
[42] Ibid., 355.
[43] Ibid., 358.
[44] Bräutigam, Deborah. Quoted from SIS-647 "Governance, Democracy, and Development," Week Three (January 28, 2003) lecture notes.
[45] McGirk, Tim**.** "Vicente Fox Quesada**"** *Time Europe*. December 25, 2000 VOL. 156 NO. 26 <http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2000/1225/poy_fox.html>
[46] Linz, Juan J. and Alfred C. Stepan. 1996. "Toward Consolidated Democracies." *Journal of Democracy.* 7.2 (1996): 15.
[47] Ibid., 16.
[48] Ibid., 14-15.
[49] Ibid., 17.
[50] Ibid., 17.
[51] Ibid., 18.

[52] Writing in the *Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith recognized this important balance and insisted the state had a role to play in:

> First, the duty of protecting the society from violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.

Quoted in Linz and Stepan, 22.

[53] A professor of economics, Max Weber (1864-1920) "occupies," as Vago contends, "a central position among the law and society theorists." For an overview of Weber's theoretical background, see Vago, 49-51.
[54] For an insightful study on the linkage between colonial history, economic development, and democracy see Bollens, Kenneth and Robert Jackman. "Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income." *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 50 No. 4 (1985): 438-457. See also Pastor, Robert. "The Third Dimension of Accountability: The International Community in National Elections." In *The Self-Restraining State*, 126-27. For a study on the relationship between the length of occupation and the degree to which consolidation has occurred, Pastor cites Axel Hadenius's 1992. *Democracy and Development.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 132.
[55] See Putnam 1993.
[56] Pastor, 135.
[57] See Lipset 1959.
[58] Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* (January): 177.
[59] See Machiavelli. *The Prince.* Translated by Leo Paul de Alvarez. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1989.
[60] Hislope, Robert. 1996. "Ethnic Conflict and the 'Generosity Moment'" *Journal of Democracy* vol. 9, no. 1: 142-43.
[61] Hislope, 142.
[62] Swarns, Rachael L. "Robben Island Journal; With Vivid Palette, Mandela Depicts the Jailhouse Years." *New York Times*. February 12, 2003. <http://query.nytimes.com/search/article-page.html?res=9E06E0DD163AF931A25751C0A9659C8B63>
[63] Borrowing from physics, KE=1/2(m)(v_), where KE is the kinetic energy, m is the mass, and v is the velocity. It may be said that, relative to actions, conditions have high mass but low velocity. Indeed, as Putnam says, "*Social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions*." (See *Making Democracy Work*, 182.) Conversely, actions, committed by an individual or a given society, have relatively low mass but high velocity.
[64] See Cooper, John M. and D. S Hutchinson, eds. 1997. *Plato: Complete Works.* Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 150c5-d3.
[65] Tocqueville, Alexis de . *Democracy in America*. University of Virginia. From the Henry Reeve Translation, revised and corrected, 1839. <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/preface.htm>

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Prison Violence and Social Capital: An Analysis of Adult State Correctional Facilities

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Abstract

This study examines the role of social capital in reducing prison violence and the extent to which prisons facilitating social capital experience different rates of collective violence, inmate violence, and violence against the staff. This paper suggests that in prison environments conducive to social capital, relationships and subgroups among inmates are used as informal methods of social control to diminish prison violence. Using a regression analysis, the author concludes that it is not clear whether social capital contributes to levels of violence within prisons, but that environments where it is most likely to flourish appear potentially conducive to non-violent behavior.

Over the past century, the criminal justice system has undertaken multiple and often conflicting responsibilities, ranging from punishment and rehabilitation to deterrence and inmate social reintegration. [1] Despite these shifting paradigms in justice, correctional facilities must ensure the safekeeping of those living within their walls. While the function of a prison was once described by McCorkle as the "secure safekeeping of all inmates and personnel within…maintaining and improving the welfare of all inmates confined in it", [2] such is not the experience of inmates who experience the horrors of physical victimization and sexual predation, nor that of the guards whose lives and safety are often jeopardized by inmate assaults and collective disturbances. This study examines prison violence

and introduces the notion of social capital within correctional institutions as a means through which inmates can normalize non-violent behavior.

Historically, prison rates of violence and homicide have varied by state and region. A study in a Tennessee State Penitentiary in the early 1970s noted 19 stabbing incidents that occurred within slightly over one year. [3] Between 1969 and 1972, 211 stabbing incidents occurred in a Louisiana prison, 11 of which were fatal. [4] In 1974, there were one hundred and ninety-seven recorded male stabling incidents within the California prison system. [5] In 1990 alone, Camp and Camp report that "nearly 100 inmates were murdered; another 10,000 or so were victims of severe assaults that required medical attention". [6] Collective violence poses additional threats to the safety and order of correctional institutions when they erupt or intensify to riot-level. In the 1920s, 1950s, and 1970s, waves of prison riots stirred the public's interest in understanding, preventing, and controlling prison violence.[7] Of the 300 prison riots that have been documented since 1774, approximately 270 occurred within the past fifty years. [8] Today, assaults on inmates and guards, sexual predation, riots, and gang violence are among some of the major dilemmas shared by inmates and their families, prison administrators and staff, and correctional guards. While prison disorder may occur on an individual level or may erupt collectively, prison environments that are conducive to violence and collective action are products of more than just inmate coping deficiencies or isolated managerial and administrative policies. Literature on prison violence recognizes many aspects of prisons that may simultaneously cultivate violent eruptions or victimization. For individual-level and aggregate disruptions to occur, however, perpetrators must not only possess the motivation and drive, but the capacity and resources to carry out certain behaviors within environments that are highly regulated and controlled.

Social Capital

The theory of social capital has been applied to various institutions and communities as a "resource for action", [9] where certain achievements and levels of productivity are enacted through relationships among persons. Social capital has been described as a "web of cooperative relationships between citizens that facilitates resolution of collective action problems" [10] that enables certain communities to engage in cooperative problem-solving. It has has facilitated not only economic and political actions, but has also contributed to lowered rates of crime, teenage pregnancy, and juvenile delinquency. [11]

Mansbridge [12] has also explored the role of social capital in political systems, which require reciprocal trust, monitoring systems, and sanctioning. Coleman [13] recognized the existence of social capital within families, schools, communities, and in markets. More recently, Akerlof and Yellen [14] refer to forms of social capital in their model of gang behavior and community cooperation. The principles behind social capital theory involve social structures and networks, appropriable social organizations, obligations and expectations, trust, information channels, and closure of social norms, all of which may explain the facilitation of action. [15]

Coleman's [16] model describes many elements that are applicable to correctional environments, ranging from obligations and expectations to information channels, social norms, and social networks. Though the application of social capital has been largely limited to the fields of political science and economics, its relevance as a counterpart to socio-cultural theories of violence may contribute towards understanding inmate violence and prison culture.

Proposed Theory of Non-Violent Norms and Social Capital in Prisons

Correctional institutions house many violent and dangerous offenders, yet the "vast majority of people filling our expensive new prisons are nonviolent property and drug offenders". [17] For these non-violent offenders with shorter prison sentences, engaging in violent behavior or incurring disciplinary infractions is counterproductive to their potential for successful social reintegration. Johnson reports findings of a Leavenworth prison where nearly 80 percent of the inmates "try to avoid trouble" [18]. Furthermore, he states that the majority of inmates stay to themselves to avert trouble.

However, inmates will seek methods to ease the pains of confinement and alleviate trauma of their incarceration experience when confronted with a stressful situation. This may involve a range of nonviolent actions and strategies, such as engaging in withdrawal, substance abuse, isolation through protective custody, recreational activities, nonviolent strikes, and even semi-disruptive actions such as non-compliance and disobedience. [19] When bureaucratic procedures are perceived as empty gestures of formalism, inmates may resort to other coping methods. Those experiencing overwhelming tension and stress often face dilemmas whereby maximizing their individual short-term interests (i.e. tension reduction) through violent be-

havior may also harm the collective prison population. [20] Rates of inmate victimization may increase when the collective prison population is disrupted, thus magnifying individual stress levels to a greater extent.

Sykes [21] describes a "cohesively-oriented prisoner committed to the values of inmate loyalty, generosity, endurance, and the curbing of frictions who does much to maintain the prison's equilibrium". [22] When prison officials curtail this power, the peaceful environment is no longer sustainable and "the stage has been set for insurrection". [23] Riots may be means through which inmates can reduce this tension and stress, voice their grievances, and regain institutional equilibrium. Similarly, Parisi [24] claims that aggression may be a "tension-reducing coping style of some inmates or groups of inmates, but certainly at the expense of increasing stress among other inmates".[25] Thus, when inmates commit infractions against other inmates or guards, their behavior jeopardizes the entire prison community.

Putnam [26] suggests that in communities where social capital is plentiful, life is easier due to reciprocity, social trust, increased coordination, and communication – all of which enable collective action and problem-solving. Given the enormous presence of non-violent offenders in many prisons, a large segment of the prison population can be expected to share a collective attitude that devalues violence despite the presence of numerous incarceration-related stressors. When the general inmate population encompasses of both violent and non-violent offenders, the "violent potential of a small number of dangerous prisoners may be suppressed by mixing them with a relatively large body of nonviolent prisoners". [27] Therefore, unity, cohesion, and order among inmates should increase in prison environments conducive to social capital, thus sustaining norms of nonviolence through social action and informal inmate organization. This provides a "resource for action" [28] to enforce the collective objective of nonviolent behavior. With informal social controls intact, fewer former controls by managerial or administrative procedures are needed to maintain order. When the prison staff is perceived as less controlling, inmates are less likely to engage in riots, collective disturbances, and violence.

This study examines the role of social capital in reducing prison violence among federal and state prison inmates. Namely, it seeks to understand what specific characteristics of correctional institutions might facilitate social capital and ultimately influence prison violence. To suggest that social capital exists within prisons, the following sections demonstrate how correctional environments are communities with norms, culture, and

associations.

Prison: Communities and Cultures

Societies benefit from the cooperative engagement of their members when striving to meet commonly held goals. [29] Within a structural model, individuals who trust others also expect others to follow prescribed rules; therefore, they are more likely themselves to "accept the decisions of authorities". [30] Undoubtedly, the same may describe prison cultures where trust in other inmates, adherence to prison norms and rules, and conflict resolution may be crucial to averting collective uprisings, violent assaults, or occasions of disorder that are dangerous and life-threatening to guards and inmates alike.

Social capital allows certain ends to be met that would otherwise be impossible and without which emerges a socially disorganized community. [31] Goals within prisons may include violence prevention, the maintenance of order, and the manifestation of a safe environment where inmates can serve their sentences without accruing additional time. The presence of social capital within correctional institutions, however, rests upon an assumption then that prisons are active social environments, rich with cultural norms, interactive communities, and complex networks through which individuals may engage in reciprocal interactions. Researchers have described prisons as often highly organized systems, albeit subject to unique norms and different expectations than those existing in free communities. Like any community, however, social capital may be present and measured in prisons not only at an aggregate community level, but also at an individual level where the feelings of trust, confidence, and participation originate. [32]

Prison environments are highly sophisticated cultures filled with "habits, behavior systems, traditions, history, customs, folkways, codes", [33] unique dynamics between inmates and prison workers, [34] and behavioral codes. [35] Prisons have also been portrayed as communities, [36] or "small societies in which inmates develop their own argot, their own code of conduct, and their own leadership ranks", [37] and where peace is maintained through the use of informal social controls and discipline enacted through laws and rules.[38] Power and authority have traditionally been key elements to sustaining social order within prison communities, yet Owen (1988) suggests that "some unique forms of cooperation and reciprocity" [39] characterize most of the relationships between inmates and guards. Therefore,

social order in prisons may be preserved through a delicate balance of interaction and respect between inmates and guards.

The inmate population itself is also a unique culture with a mix of informal groups who exhibit loyalty, organization, solidarity, attachments, and competition. [40] Inmate communication that has evolved into unique profanity and slang may be the vehicle through which positive and negative relationships are facilitated. A range of typologies have been used to classify inmates, many utilizing continuums such as the "asshole-all right continuum", [41] or labels and groupings such as snitches, elitist cliques, old timers and youngsters. Snoop distinguishes between white inmates and inmates who are "proud, black, oppressed", [42] "black, incorrigible and irrational", [43] homosexual, altruistic, and female. Cressey [44] delineates the thieves, the convicts, and the straight inmates, and Clemmer describes the "complete clique man", the "group man", "semi-solitary man", and the "complete-solitary man". [45]

Like any highly structured and intricate culture, prisons have internal structural and institutional conflicts, personal conflicts amongst prison workers, unique normative structures, power struggles within administrative echelons, disparities between inmate and officer interests, and an array of social relationships among individuals within the prison. [46] These relationships have been described as "the fundamental basis of the prison social order". [47] DiIulio lists several factors accounting for varying dimensions of prison order, including: inaccurate or biased data, inmate characteristics, expenditure levels, crowding, inmate-to-staff ratios, levels of formal training, architecture, inmate social system, inmate-staff race relations, level of inmate treatment, and repressive measures. [48]

Theories examining prison disorder have turned to a wide range of plausible determinants of collective action, riots, prison violence, and prison victimization and have explored variables ranging from social and psychological dynamics within inmate populations to managerial techniques at the administrative level. A review of the literature on prison riots and collective violence, inmate violence, and critical factors involved in such insurgences are examined next.

Inmate Victimization and Assaults

Identifying the roots of prison violence and assaults introduces a complex cyclical dynamic in which prison victimization causes other forms

of victimization, a process that has been described as an "insane feedback system through which prison victimization rates are under constant pressure to increase". [49] Delineating victim from perpetrator can be especially difficult when victimizers are instantly transformed into victims during single encounters. [50] Potential motivators for prison violence include alleviating tension through sexual victimization, economic profit, status climbing, self-defense, and opportunities for early release for disruptive inmates who deceive parole boards. This manipulation involves disruptive behavior at the onset of the sentence followed by 'improved' behavior over time. More simply, profits and gains may be reduced to mere cigarette cartons, two of which was once the "going price for a contract murder" [51] in one federal penitentiary.

Fleisher [52] reviews literature on prison violence and examines age, overcrowding, boredom, ethnic and racial tension, sexual jealousy, gang rivalries, and psychological factors. He explores Toch's notion that violent inmates are products of prison and concludes that "violent convicts commit violent acts" [53] and that convicts who experience the aforementioned factors will also commit violence. Similarly, subcultural variables that precipitate prison victimization and involve both prison staff and inmates include attempts to gain political control, economic and market conflicts, prisoner militancy, and staff subcultures that promote prisoner victimization. [54]

Importation theories, on the other hand, suggest that lower-class inmates entering prison often bring in external components that contribute to individual prisons violence. [55] These may include the values, norms, and beliefs found in violent subcultures, gender-role definitions, racist perspectives, and tension related to homosexuality. [56] Bowker also identifies "imported background variables that impact prison victimization" [57] such as age, nature of criminal history, the continuation of drug subcultures within prisons, and prior incarceration history.

Other literature has found that environmental, structural, physical factors (Bowker 1980) and administrative and management factors (Fleiser 1989, Reisig 1998, Useem and Reisig 1999) are key to understanding prison violence. While empirical evidence is scare amidst often conflicting and/or complimentary theories of prison assaults, riots, and collective action, additional empirical analyses may reveal the differences between prison with high and low rates of violence. Such predictive knowledge may be particularly relevant in a time of massive reform in sentencing policies,

increasingly harsh prison sentences, high rates of incarceration of non-violent offenders, and increasingly crowded correctional institutions. Despite a rapidly changing inmate population, prison administrators will still be held accountability when inmates or staff are injured or killed. To prevent such incidents, prisons must be capable of recognizing risk factors relevant to inmate subcultures in order to prevent prison victimization and to protect its staff.

Prison Riots, Disorder, and Collective Action

An abundance of theories and variables have been cited as causes of prison violence and riots, ranging from specific factors such as inmate access to weapons, to more complicated and intricate "evolutionary sequences" [58] involving systems of individuals such as Syke's concept of social equilibriums. [59] Other factors that have been identified include overcrowding, abuse by guards, lack of rehabilitation programs or psychiatric care, inmate inactivity, prison structure, incarceration as mentally distorting through assimilation to criminal culture, intermixing of inmates, discrepancies in parole practices, and theories that postulate that riots indicate inmate abuse. [60] Yet, many of these claims have not been substantiated through empirically based research. [61] However, recent perspectives on riots and collective violence view these incidents as occurring within a complex systems context, through which prison violence involves not only inmates, but also prison staff and structural components. Cressey asserts that riots involve not only inmate participation, but include "disturbances among staff members".[62]

Other researchers have identified administrative controls (Conrad 1996, Flynn 1973, DiIulio in McCorkle et al. 1995, Useem and Reisig 1999, DiIulio 1987), conflict theories (South Carolina Department of Corrections 1976), and multiple component or stage theories (Parisi 1982, McCorkle et al. 1995, McCorkle 1956, Wilsnack in DiIulio 1987) that are necessary towards understand prison riots.

A recent analysis of data from the U.S. Department of Justice's 1984 and 1990 censuses of adult correctional facilities found that that living conditions had no effect on prison disorder and that fewer assault rates on inmates and guards occurred prisons with programs (i.e. education, industrial, vocational). [63] Researchers noticed "little that resembles a 'community' behind the walls" [64] and found that structural, institutional, and environmental variables accounted for less than 15% of the variance in

individual and large-scale rates of violence. [65] Ultimately, however, they concluded that assault rates and collective disturbances were unrelated.

The South Carolina Department of Corrections Collective Violence Research Project (1976) found noteworthy differences between riot prison and non-riot prisons. Riots occurred more frequently in high maximum-security prisons and in prisons using certain methods of inmate classification. Within riot prisons, they also found a positive association with prison capacity, prison age, fewer time spent by wardens with inmates, higher levels of education in inmates and COs, lack of work assignments in medium and minimum security prisons, lack of recreational activities, and more administrative and punitive segregated housing. However, the question remains "*Given equal exposure to any single condition or event, why do some prison have disturbances while others do not?*" [66]

Since the 1980s and 1990s, however, large-scale changes within the criminal justice system have occurred in areas of policing, prosecution, sentencing, and prisons. Blumstein reviews some recent changes in policies and attitudes, such as skepticism over the rehabilitation model of imprisonment that has "contributed significantly to the growth in prison populations"; [67] mandatory-minimum sentencing laws; limitations placed on judicial discretion in sentencing; and the crack-cocaine epidemic of the 1980s. These enormous changes within the criminal justice system are likely to be accompanied by vast changes within inmate populations and subcultures, administrative policies and techniques, prison structures and environments, and inmate norms, values and behaviors such that models of prison violence that were widely accepted two decades ago may not be applicable to current prison systems. This study analyzes prison assaults against inmates and guards, staff and inmate deaths caused by inmates, riots, fires, and collective disturbances in order to understand prison violence. Specifically, it introduces the notion of social capital within correctional facilities as a vehicle through which inmate norms of non-violence may be disseminated to reduce prison disruptions.

It is expected that prison conditions that facilitate repeated encounters between inmates (such as multiple occupancy housing) and provide educational and work programs will experience less violence directed both towards other inmates and the institution itself. In prisons with a more diverse population, it is expected that violence against inmates will decrease due to the formation of several subgroups that enforce informal social control over their members. However, violence against inmates and

the institution is expected to rise in prisons with a higher percent of maximum-security inmates with violent tendencies. In prisons where many inmates are permitted to leave the facility unsupervised in order to participate in a special program, violence against the institution and inmates is expected to increase. Inmates who are not granted this privilege are likely to be those who are less trustworthy due to a variety of reasons, such as disciplinary infractions or disruptive behavior. Therefore, they are likely to provoke additional violence against both inmates and the institution as a symbol of their perceived injustice and as a method of generating disciplinary citations among the privileged inmates. Finally, when the ratio between the correctional staff and total number of inmates increases, violence against the institution is expected to increase.

Methods

The data in this analysis was originally collected by the U.S. Department of Justice in a 1995 Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities. [68] Data were obtained from July 1, 1994 through June 30, 1995. Unlike censuses that were conducted in prior years, the respondents in this census completed identical survey forms. The dataset includes 1500 facilities contracted to state governments, operated by joint authority, or under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 529 institutions are categorized boot camps, alcohol treatment facilities, medical facilities, and classification centers and were filtered from the dataset, resulting in 971 remaining institutions whose main function is categorized as 'general population or confinement'. Of the 971 institutions, 127 (13.1%) were federally operated, 836 (86.1%) were under state departments of corrections jurisdiction, and 8 (0.8%) were operated by local/joint authority. Of the prisons, 243 (25%) were classified as maximum/close/high, 391(40.27%) as medium level, 335 (34.5%) as minimum/low, and 2 (0.21%) as administrative custody. The total reported prison population from the 971 prisons was 862,312 with a mean inmate count (on June 30, 1995) of 888.07 (s.d.= 872.78). Prison populations ranged from 20 to 6257 inmates. On average, the institutions held 833.14 males and 54.92 females. Of the inmates included in the survey, 35.44% were Caucasian, and 48.03% African American. The average inmate classifications by gender and security level were: maximum males (179.95), maximum females (4.63), medium males (356.2), medium females (17.95), minimum males (279.59), and minimum females (28.01).

In this nonexperimental design using statistical controls, three

models were constructed to determine whether variation in inmate-inflicted violence directed towards inmates (*inmate)*, inmate-inflicted incidents affecting the staff and institution (*institution)*, or total inmate-inflicted incidents (*total)* could be attributed to the structural properties of the institution, demographics of the inmate population, and other institutional programs and policies. The construction of three dependent variables enabled specific and aggregate analyses of violence directed towards inmates and towards the institution.

Prisons varying in the percentages of maximum-security inmates housed were expected to report diverse levels and types of violence; thus heteroskedasticity was suspected in the disturbance terms of the *percent maximum security* variable. This suspicion was verified by plotting the squared residuals obtained from the *institution* and *total* models against *percent of maximum-security inmates*. Graphical evidence also indicated unequal variance in the squared residuals across observations when variables in the *inmate* regression model were plotted against *percent of inmates on death row*. The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test was used to calculate an alternate estimate of the squared residuals ($\_^2$) in order to detect heteroskedasticity. By dividing the residual sum of squares for each relevant regression by the total number of observations, the maximum likelihood estimator [MLE] was calculated and used to create p_i [(squared residuals)/MLE]. By regressing p_i on the two variables suspected of causing heteroskedasticity and then dividing the resulting estimated sum of squares in half [with a chi-square distribution], with degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent variables, the resulting test statistic reinforced the earlier hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in both variables. Additional graphical evidence suggested that for many other independent variables, the squared residuals were heteroskedastic, which may result from extreme outliers in some variables and errors in the model specification.

A square-root transformation in the *institution* and *total* models was initially used to correct for heteroskedastity, but in attempts to create homoskedastic variances in each model, the transformed equations resulted in severe multicollinearity among the independent and control variables, as indicated by VIF statistics exceeding 1000, high bivariate correlations, auxiliary tests, and TOL values exceeding 1. Thus, correcting for heteroskedasticity through a GLS transformation exacerbated the problem by introducing near-multicollinearity in each model. Thus, OLS was used for three original models despite the presence of heteroskedasticity. Though many t-statistics were statistically significant with high R^2s, the indepen-

dent variables were highly correlated. The differences between the GLS and OLS estimators suggest a spurious association where high correlations among transformed variables disappear when the original equation is applied. [69] Due to the unknown variance ($ó^2i$) in each model, and without assumptions regarding the error variance and independent variable, no additional transformations were used.

Dependent Variables

For the purpose of this study, the terms *violence* and *infractions* will be used interchangeably to reflect all assaults, all deaths, riots, fires, and all reported disturbances. Prison violence was measured in by constructing three separate dependent variables: 1) violence against other inmates, 2) infractions against the institution, and 3) total infractions against both inmates and the institution. The *infractions against inmates* variable measures the sum of inmate-inflicted inmate deaths and inmate assaults (physical or sexual) on other inmates. *Infractions against the institution* reflects the sum of inmate-inflicted assaults (physical or sexual) against the staff, inmates-inflicted staff deaths, total reported riots (defined as involving five or more inmates and resulting in serious injury or significant property damage), total fires resulting in damages of over $50.00, and other disturbances. *Total infractions* aggregates all infractions against inmates and the institution. The frequency and mean of each incident category from the 971 institutions are listed in Table A.

Table A: Total and Mean Number of Recorded Assaults, Inmate/Staff Deaths, Riots, Fires, and Other Disturbances

Incident	Total	Mean
Assaults on facility staff	11550	12.12
Assaults on other inmates	22429	23.73
Staff deaths from assaults	14	0.014
Inmate deaths from assaults	74	0.076
Fires	707	0.73
Riots	290	0.3
Other disturbances	1751	1.81

For each dependent variable in each of the three models, the total number of relevant incidents per each institution was divided by the total number of inmates from that institution and multiplied by 100 to create a

value reflecting the number of incidents per 100 inmates.

Independent Variables

To identify prison conditions conducive to building or maintaining social capital, the independent variables reflect the following factors: (a) size of the inmate population, (b) means through which inmates could repeatedly interact, (c) inmate diversity, (d) number of correctional officers, (e) program participation, and (f) correspondence with family.

The number of inmates per institution was measured by the reported inmate count on June 30, 1995. Means through which inmates could repeatedly interact and would allow for social norms and subcultures to develop and the dissemination of values and beliefs include: *percent of inmates in multiple occupancy housing, percent of inmates on work assignments,* and *ratio of total number of prison programs to total number of inmates* (i.e. basic adult education, secondary education (GED), special education for inmates with learning disabilities, vocational training, college courses, study release, drug dependency, mental health counseling, employment, life skills and community adjustment, parenting, and others). The latter variable is an indicator of the potential circumstances where inmates may interact and cooperate. Diversity was measured by multiplying the proportion of white inmates per institution by the proportion of African American inmates. Other racial categories were not included due to a lack of variance. Participation in educational programs was measured by the percentage of inmates enrolled in any type of educational programs. Finally, a dummy variable indicating whether children were allowed to spend the night at the facility was created by entering a "1" if children are not permitted to stay overnight and "0" if they were permitted.

Control Variables

Several control variables were used to account for differences between the prisons. These include: *overcrowding* (measured by the total number of inmates divided by the rated capacity and multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage over capacity), *percent of inmates under18 years of age*, *percent of inmates on death row*, *percent of maximum security inmates*, *ratio of correctional staff* (excluding administrators, maintenance clerics, professional/treatment staff) *to inmate population*, and *percent of inmates in special custody* (administrative, protective, and disciplinary).

Dependent Variables	**INST**= Total incidents against **institution** per 100 inmates (assaults against staff, staff deaths, riots, fires, disturbances) **INM**= Total incidents against **inmates** per 100 inmate (inmate assaults and inmate deaths by other inmates) **TOT**= **Total** incidents per 100 inmates (all assaults, all inmate inflicted deaths, riots, fires, disturbances)
Independent Variables	**POP** = Total prison population **MULT**= % of inmates in multiple occupancy housing **PROG**= Ratio (programs: inmates) **DIV**= Diversity (proportion African American * proportion. Caucasian) **EDU**= % of inmates in educational program **CHIL** = Children allowed to stay overnight dummy (1=no) **WRK** = % of inmates on work assignment

A dummy variable (*federal)* controlled for prisons operated by different jurisdictions, thus allowing for a comparison between federally operated institutions and those run by the state or by joint/local authority. Due to the lack of variance in the joint/local variable, the reference category represents all prisons under state and joint/local authority. In the federal dummy variable, a "1" was entered if the prison is federally operated and "0" if state or local.

Some prisons housed women only, men only, or both men and women. To control for the variation in gender between prisons, a dummy variable was created for *women only* and for *women/men* where "1" was entered if it satisfied the description and "0" if otherwise. The reference category was *men only* prisons. Some prisons afforded inmates the privilege of leaving the institution without supervision on a regular basis for various reasons. To control for this policy difference among prisons, a dummy variable was created where "1" indicates that the prison where over 50 percent of the inmates are permitted to leave and "0" if less than 50 percent leave the prison.

Table B: Regression Models and Variables

Controls	**FED**= Federal dummy (1= federally operated, 0 = state or joint/local operated) **JUV** = % of inmates under 18 years **SPEC** = % of inmates in special custody (admin., protect., disciplinary.) **ROW** = % of inmates on death row **MAX** = % maximum security inmates **STAF** = Ratio: (correctional staff): (inmates) **WOM** = Women only dummy (1= prison houses only women) **MEN**= Women and men dummy (1= prison houses women and men) **LEAV** = Leave dummy (1 = 50% or more permitted to leave, 0 = less than 50% **OVER**= % overcapacity
	Results
Models	
	INST $= \beta_1 + \beta_2(POP)_i + \beta_3[MULT]_i + \beta_4[PROG]_i + \beta_5[DIV]_i + \beta_6[EDU]_i + \beta_7[CHIL]_i + \beta_8[WRK]_i + \beta_9[FED]_i + \beta_{10}[JUV]_i + \beta_{11}[SPEC]_i + \beta_{12}[ROW]_i + \beta_{13}[MAX]_i + \beta_{14}[STAF]_i + \beta_{15}[WOM]_i + \beta_{16}[MEN]_i + \beta_{17}[LEAV]_i + \beta_{18}[OVER]_i + \mu_i$
	INM $= \beta_1 + \beta_2(POP)_j + \beta_3[MULT]_j + \beta_4[PROG]_j + \beta_5[DIV]_j + \beta_6[EDU]_j + \beta_7[CHIL]_j + \beta_8[WRK]_j + \beta_9[FED]_j + \beta_{10}[JUV]_j + \beta_{11}[SPEC]_j + \beta_{12}[ROW]_j + \beta_{13}[MAX]_j + \beta_{14}[STAF]_j + \beta_{15}[WOM]_j + \beta_{16}[MEN]_j + \beta_{17}[LEAV]_j + \beta_{18}[OVER]_j + \mu_j$
	TOT $= \beta_1 + \beta_2(POP)_k + \beta_3[MULT]_k + \beta_4[PROG]_k + \beta_5[DIV]_k + \beta_6[EDU]_k + \beta_7[CHIL]_k + \beta_8[WRK]_k + \beta_9[FED]_k + \beta_{10}[JUV]_k + \beta_{11}[SPEC]_k + \beta_{12}[ROW]_k + \beta_{13}[MAX]_k + \beta_{14}[STAF]_k + \beta_{15}[WOM]_k + \beta_{16}[MEN]_k + \beta_{17}[LEAV]_k + \beta_{18}[OVER]_k + \mu_k$

Table C summarizes findings from the three separate regressions examining violence directed towards 1) inmates, 2) institution, and 3) both inmates and institution. Overall, the model accounted for 32.9% of the variance in violence directed towards the institution (R^2 =0.329, F = 27.484, p = 0.0), 13.0% of the variance in inmate on inmate violence ((R^2 =0.130, F = 8.349, p = 0.0), and 25.9% of the variation in the *total* dependent variable.

The results indicate that by holding all other variables constant, multiple housing had a significantly negative effect only on the number of incidents against the institution. For every percent increase in the number of inmates in multiple occupancy housing, controlling for all else, the num-

ber of incidents against the institution per 100 inmates decreased on average by 0.144. While it was suspected that increased overcapacity would result in increased incidents of violence, it did not have a statistically significant effect in any models. Diversity also appeared to have a significantly large role in reducing the overall number of incidents, especially violence directed against inmates. For every unit increase in the diversity scale (proportion of African American inmates multiplied by proportion of White inmates), the number of total incidents per 100 inmates decreased on average by 5.33 and the number of infractions against inmates per 100 inmates on average by 4.761 when controlling for all else. The number of inmates in special custody also appeared to be significantly related to prison violence.

While the percent of inmates on death row was not statistically significant in each of the three models, the percent of inmates in maximum security was positively associated with a slight increase of violence towards the institution and total violence. Some of the prisons housed inmates who were under 18 years old. As suspected, the number of incidents against inmates increased on average by 0.24 per 100 inmates for every percent increase in inmates under 18.

The findings also indicate that the number of inmates on work assignment is negatively related to violence against the institution and total violence, although the substantive interpretation may not be meaningful. These decreases may not have a noticeable effect within prisons. Interestingly, when over 50% of inmates are permitted to leave the institution unsupervised for a range of reasons, violence against the institution seems to increase. The prison environment also had an impact on violence directed towards the institution and towards inmates. When compared to prisons with only male inmates, prisons with both men and women experienced, on average, 0.749 fewer incidents against the institution per 100 inmates. Prisons housing women only showed no statistically significant impact on any form of violence. Finally, federally operated institutions experienced 0.806 fewer incidents against inmates per 100 inmates on average than did the sample of joint/local authority and state operated prisons.

Table C: Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients from Three Regressions:

Total Incidents, Infractions Against Inmates, Infractions Against Institution (per 100 inmates)

	Total Unstand. B	Std. Error	Std. Coeff. Beta	Inmates B	Std. Error	Std. Coeff Beta	Institution B	Std. Errors	Std. Coeffi Beta
Inmate Population	9.03E-05	0	0.014	6.68E-05	0	0.016	1.87E-05	0	0.005
% Multiple Occupancy	-1.07E-02	0.008	-0.048	3.33E-03	0.005	0.023	-1.44E-02	0.004	-0.122
Programs: Inmates	-4.538	7.084	-0.024	-1.368	4.931	-0.011	-3.164	3.57	-0.031
Diversity	**-5.336** ↓	2.616	-0.061	**-4.761** ↓	1.821	-0.085	**-0.535**	1.318	-0.012
% Education programs	-1.93E-03	0.01	-0.006	-1.94E-03	0.007	-0.009	-2.26E-04	0.005	-0.001
Children dummy	0.986	0.697	0.046	0.728	0.485	0.053	0.24	0.351	0.021
% Under 18	0.167	0.14	0.034	**.240** ↑	0.097	0.076	-4.06E-02	0.071	-0.016
% On death row	0.133	0.122	0.032	9.80E-02	0.085	0.036	3.00E-02	0.062	0.013
% Maximum security	**1.960E-02** ↑	0.008	0.093	3.49E-03	0.005	0.026	**1.691E-02** ↑	0.004	0.151
% Work assignment	**-1.284E-02** ↓	0.007	-0.055	-4.88E-03	0.005	-0.033	**-8.360E-03** ↓	0.004	-0.068
Women only dummy	7.24E-02	0.603	0.004	1.78E-02	0.42	0.001	7.20E-02	0.304	0.007
Women/Men dummy	-0.481	0.707	-0.02	0.25	0.492	0.016	**-.749** ↓	0.356	-0.059
Officers: Inmates	2.048	1.321	0.053	1.358	0.919	0.055	0.638	0.665	0.031
Overcrowding	7.08E-03	0.007	0.033	4.15E-03	0.005	0.03	2.70E-03	0.003	0.023
% In special custody	**.254** ↑	0.023	0.368	**.117** ↑	0.016	0.264	**.137** ↑	0.012	0.375
Leave dummy	0.401	0.842	0.015	-0.259	0.586	-0.015	**.712** ↑	0.424	0.051
Federal dummy	-0.415	0.51	-0.024	**-.806** ↓	0.355	-0.074	0.333	0.257	0.037

Discussion

The findings from the three regression analyses suggest that in prison environments conducive to social capital, certain forms of prison violence may decrease. An increase in the percentage of inmates living in multiple occupancy housing appears to reduce the total number of riots, fires, and assaults on inmates, and staff deaths. Though this finding may not be substantively significant, it still suggests that when inmates are exposed to each other and are able to communicate freely, they may develop norms that devalue infractions and violence against the prison. This can have rewarding consequences, such that tension and stress between and among staff and prisoners may be alleviated, fewer inmates receive disciplinary infractions, and a peaceful equilibrium may be preserved within the prison environment. This enables inmates to engage in informal social organization through which cooperation, reciprocity, and trust may be facilitated. [70] As a result, the nonviolent beliefs and values held by many of the nonviolent inmates may be fostered and dispersed throughout the prison.

In addition, prisons with more maximum-security inmates experience more infractions against the institutions and the total amount of violence. This may be explained by the higher degrees of freedom granted to minimum- or low- security inmates, which may allow for the development of informal social networks, subgroups, communication channels, and provide more opportunities for cooperation and reciprocity. With more inmates classified as maximum-security who are in single cells, the less likely they are to interact with other inmates, which is crucial to forming or strengthening social capital and cooperative behaviors. When these inmates are isolated from each other and the general inmate population, the values of the nonviolent inmates are difficult to disseminate and fewer informal social controls may exist to reinforce non-violent behaviors. Therefore, it is not surprising that much of their violence is directed towards the institution, as well as in the *total* model. However, it is likely that the increase in maximum-security inmates is associated with violence against the institution due to the often violent and impulsive nature of the inmates rather than the prison conditions.

Increased diversity also has a large violence reducing effect on the total number of incidents, especially those directed towards inmates. With increased diversity, fewer inmates who are perceived as minorities the number of subgroups increases. These groups, or cliques, may be fairly small in diverse populations but may provide the context in which values,

beliefs, norms, and trust may be generated between inmates. In addition, inmates who belong to small subgroups may interact with their peers more frequently, thus providing opportunities for communication channels to develop and for more occasions of cooperation and reciprocity. As a result, the reduced number of incidents directed towards other inmates seems likely to be a product of the many subgroups in which inmates may divide themselves within a diverse inmate population. It should be noted, however, that only African American and Caucasian inmates were included in the measure of diversity. By including other racial/ethnic groups (Asian Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic/Latinos) to increase variation in the diversity measure, and by and examining the geographical locations of the prisons in future studies, regional differences regarding the effect of diversity upon violence may be detected.

Some elements expected to foster social capital were not statistically significant, such as the ratio of the number of educational/special programs inmates the percent of inmates in educational programs, and when the ratio between the number of correctional officers and inmates was low. It was also expected that prisons allowing children to spend the night would generally experience less violence, but no evidence of this was detected. However, only 75 prisons allowed children to spend the night at the institution, allowing for little variance in observations. This suggests that certain prison conditions, while likely to cultivate norms and channels of communication, may not influence levels of violence within today's prison population. However, other control variables produced more significant results.

The percent of inmates in administrative, protective, and disciplinary custody appears to be significantly related to violence towards inmates, the institution, and overall violence. Where a larger percent of the inmate population is under the direct control and supervision of the prison staff, more violence can be expected to ensue against the institution. Though the percent of inmates in special custody was statistically significant, the low parameter estimates indicate that this finding may have a minimal substantive impact.

In facilities housing a greater percent of inmates under 18 years old, there appears to be a slight increase of violence against other inmates. This may be explained by developmental, experiential, and maturational differences between youthful offenders and adult inmates. Younger offenders are often violent and it is not surprising that their violent tenden-

cies emerge in the form of assaults against each other. Further, older and seasoned inmates may attempt to intimidate or use younger inmates, both physically and sexually, which may result in physical altercations.

It appears that the elements increasing or reducing violence against inmates may be different from those resulting in violence against the institutions. This may be an indicator that informal social controls among inmates can be used to reduce violence against each other, against the institution, or both. By examining the standardized coefficients in the *total* model, it appears that the reduction in the number of incidents per 100 inmates is more responsive to the level of diversity than to the percent of inmates on work assignment. However, the violence is more responsive to the percent of inmates in special custody than to the percent in maximum security when violence increases.

Overall, relationships and subgroups among inmates might serve as an informal method of social control that can further diminish the number of incidents against the institution. Similarly, prisons with more inmates in special custody have the greatest impact on the variation of violence in institutions. Where the percent of inmates in special custody increases violence among inmates, it might also heighten the violence against the institution since the informal controls against such violence are not intact among the inmates. It is likely that where violence against inmates is present, more disorganization occurs and as a result, incentives to not commit infractions against the institution are not effective. Likewise, where violence against inmates is low, non-violent inmates may be drawing upon resources to promote their non-violent interests. [71] In the absence of violence, there may be a level of trustworthiness that allows the prison population to "accomplish much more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness", [72] thus further reducing the likelihood of infractions against the institution. Ultimately, it is not clear whether social capital per se contributes to levels of violence within prisons, but environments where it is most likely to flourish appear potentially conducive to promoting non-violent behaviors.

Limitations

Several limitations to this study should be noted. The dependent variables are measured as number of incidents and therefore cannot be a negative; thus, there is no upper bound and the lower bound is unobservable. Future analyses should use statistical procedures to correct for this.

Further, the surveys do not reflect demographic data about the inmates regarding age, type of offense, length of sentence, criminal history, substance abuse, use of prescribed medication, and detailed information regarding each violent incident within prison.

While the standardized questionnaire used in this census ensures high measurement reliability, the use of second-hand data does not guarantee that the surveys were accurately completed. Further, recording procedures varying across jurisdictions suggests potential instrumentation effects, which may be a potential source of measurement error in the dependent variables. Officers may underreport incidents and each prison may have different definitions of what constitutes an infraction. Therefore**,** we risk measurement error in both the independent and dependent variables, which may result in misleading conclusions. Multiple treatment interference also threatens the internal validity of each model such that the combination of individual elements in certain prisons may enhance or reduce prison violence to a greater extent than each element individually. McCorkle et al. [73] propose that increased security may lead to both increases and decreases in violence, suggesting that any one variable may have polar effects across different prisons.

Though the parameter estimates may remain unbiased when we have systematic measurement error in the dependent variables, we would encounter large standard errors and inconsistent estimates. Also, by measuring social capital through several independent variables instead of an index or scale remains another potential source of measurement error. Thus, further research on measuring social capital in correctional institutions is necessary. In addition, future analyses should use a weighting system to account for the severity of each offense and also determine if the indicators measuring violence against inmates and violence against the institution are correlated.

Despite the findings of this study, any statistical and substantive interpretations should be approached with caution due to the remaining heteroskedasticity. By using OLS regardless of the heteroskedastic disturbance terms in each model, we are likely to encounter estimators that are unbiased but inefficient. Because the variance has not been minimized, the standard errors may be inflated and confidence intervals too wide. In addition, the t-statistics may be too small due to the large standard errors, and the F-statistics may be inaccurate as well. Thus, any findings derived from this study risk inaccuracy and may produce misleading conclusions.

Conducting additional statistical tests to detect heteroskedasticity and isolate the responsible variables may enable us to transform the models such that the disturbance terms are homoskedastic. Techniques commonly used are the Glejser test, the Goldfeld-Quandt test, and the Park test. [74] In addition, White's heteroskedasticity-consistent variances and standard errors procedure may be practical in attaining consistent variance. Further, the models in this study were created under the assumption of linearity in each parameter, thus risking poor functional form.

Future Research

This study assumes that social capital exists in prisons, although measurement may be difficult. Further research may reveal methods of measuring norms and indicators of social capital in prison. It is also important to determine whether social capital actually reduces violence and disciplinary infractions rather than establishing norms that increase collective violence and disturbances. It is possible that different inmate populations utilize social capital differently as a function of institutional structure, gender, characteristics of staff, and diversity. Additional research may also study racial compositions among inmate populations to determine whether diversity reduces or increases infractions. If so, is there an optimal level of diversity? Is violence in homogeneous prison populations different than environments with more diversity? Is violence against inmates significantly different than violence directed towards the institution? Does the type and severity of violence/infraction change with different prison populations? Clearly, more research is needed to examine positive and cooperative behaviors among prison populations and to determine what factors may make prisons safer for inmates and staff.

Conclusion

Findings from this study suggest that certain violence-reducing factors among inmates are different from violence directed towards the institution. Whether violence against inmates instigates violence against the institution is left to be determined. In prisons with less violence among the inmate population, informal social controls may be reducing violence directed towards the institution. To create and sustain a system of nonviolence, inmates may be utilizing behaviors that are characteristic of communities with high levels of social capital. Further analysis is needed to understand the way that resources within prisons may be combined to create "different system-level behavior" [75] and to determine whether social

capital among inmates is a valuable resource for the entire institution. Ultimately, when fewer riots, fires, disturbances, and assaults are directed towards the institution, prison staff and guards can work under safer conditions and institutions can operate more efficiently.

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Religiosity, Presidential Campaign Discourse and The Democratic Party

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Abstract

This essay seeks to examine the effect religion, or at least the rhetoric of religion also called religiosity, has had on Republican and Democratic Party campaign discourse in the last twenty to thirty years. The influx of religious messages and themes, particularly in presidential campaigning, is widely accepted and understood to be an ongoing trend since the birth of our nation. Empirical evidence proves this is not the case. Rather, the recent rise in religiosity represents a shift in the general political debate that has impacted not only the Republican Party, but the Democratic Party as well.

Religion must be considered as a value that affects how issues are framed, how candidates campaign, and ultimately how citizens vote. Whether this religiosity is good or bad, however, is not the focus of the research at hand. Neither does this endeavor argue whether religion and politics should be mixed or what that mix means to the separation of church and state. While these are extremely important questions, this essay represents an attempt to look the rise in religiosity from a different point of view.

First, this research provides evidence of the increased religiosity in recent presidential campaign discourse and demonstrates that this rise is disproportionate with the nation's overall religiousness. Second, it considers why the conservative religious right became politically active when it did and how it influenced the Republican Party. Third, it demonstrates that this shift by the Republicans eventually forced the Democrats to shift their campaign messages as well. Finally, this essay argues that religion is an extremely important social factor influencing issues and candidate preferences for voters. Therefore, the use of religiosity as campaign rhetoric is worthy of careful scholarly attention.

Introduction

Religion or at least the rhetoric of religion (religiosity) has become more prevalent in recent Republican and Democratic Party campaign discourse resulting in a shift in the general political debate. Religion is a value[1] that effects how individuals frame issues and thus all candidates must address their opponent's religiosity messages. This reality has prompted many political scientists to debate whether religiosity is a good or a bad thing, if religion and politics should be mixed, and what it all means to the separation of church and state. While these are extremely important questions, this essay represents an attempt to look the rise in religiosity from a different angle.

First, this essay provides evidence of the increased religiosity in recent presidential campaign discourse and demonstrates that this rise is disproportionate with the nation's overall religiousness. Second, it considers why the conservative religious right became politically active when it did and how it influenced the Republican Party. Third, it demonstrates that this shift by the Republicans eventually forced the Democrats to shift their campaign messages as well. Finally, this essay argues that religion is an extremely important social factor influencing issues and candidate preferences for voters.

Semantics can easily cloud this discussion. In many ways, words have become weapons for opposing groups and many words have come to carry pejorative baggage. This essay has attempted to avoid such negative uses. The first challenge is what to call the organization or movement in question. While the Moral Majority, Christian Coalition, religious conservative, religious right and Christian Right are often interchanged, there is no one acceptable term to describe this movement. Each group is different and any attempt to paint them as monolithic in thought or demographics is inherently problematic. Conservative religious people observe many faiths. Combined with other sociological factors, religious people may be conservative on social issues, yet liberal on economic ones. Others might be conservative on both fronts. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, the term *conservative religious right* will be used as this term best embodies the conservative views of people of varying faiths who, until recently, tended to receive their political cues from a more traditionalist-American-values perspective. Second, religiosity is the primary focus of this discussion. While many of the individuals and players may be devout, neither the Democrats nor Republicans can honestly claim to be the party of God. Therefore al-

though the campaign theme may be religion, religiosity is used to operationalize the message.

Rising Religiosity

This essay is based on the primary assumption that religiosity is more explicit in recent presidential campaigns, a topic that has been addressed by many fronts including the media, candidates, research organizations, political scientists, and party platforms. A survey of these players supports the primary assumption. The Washington Post wrote in 2000 "…that God is getting too much attention this election season" and that "a bidding war on religion, in which the question becomes which side is more devout," had ensued.[2] Ellen Willis from The Nation wrote "Al Gore and Joe Lieberman did their best to outdo the Republicans at religiosity."[3] Senator Lieberman stated in March 2001, "The role of religion in public life is no longer the underlying discussion. It is the discussion… After decades of being coy and hesitant, people of faith have finally given themselves permission to speak in public."[4] The Pew Charitable Trusts found the issue to be so important they invested $10 million in the Religious Communities and the American Public Square initiative. This is intended "to foster greater public understanding of the importance of the religious voice in the renewal of American democracy, and to provide people of faith with the institutional resources they need to translate their religious beliefs into a healthy civic engagement."[5]

Many political scientists agree. Robert Zwier declares, "Religion has invaded politics."[6] Mark Silk writes "Hardly had the 2000 campaign begun that Bush, most of the rest of the early Republican flock, and Vice President Al Gore were testifying to their faith more vociferously than any presidential aspirants in living memory."[7] Michael Kazin admits it was difficult to tell whether Bush or Gore was the more zealot Christian in 2000.[8] A survey by John C. Green revealed "an intensification of the traditional connections of particular faiths to party politics, aided by the religious rhetoric in the campaign."[9] Gerald Pomper and Bill Galston both agree that religion, whether the true practice or the rhetoric of religiosity, is certainly more evident today than it was in recent decades.[10]

Party platforms demonstrate that the current level of religiosity is extraordinary for both the Republicans and Democrats. Although proclamations of faith and God-given rights seem normal today, the trend has been more of an evolution rather than a perpetuation of tradition. As will

be discussed in more detail later, many cultural changes occurred in America throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Supreme Court decisions regarding desegregation, school prayer and the Equal Rights Amendment incensed many conservative religious constituents. Not until 1973, however, and the Roe v. Wade decision to decriminalize abortion did these conservative religious individuals begin to organize into vocal political activist groups. With dedicated leadership, organization and abundant funding, these groups were able to pressure the Parties to consider their positions on social issues. By the end of the 1970s, conservative religious organizations found a home in the Republican Party, thus becoming the *conservative religious right*. As platforms have been called the "barometers of changing public opinion and emerging trends across most of the nation's political history,"[11] a platform is the perfect tool with which to track this evolution of religiosity.

Republican National Platforms

First, the Republican Party platforms demonstrate the increased religiosity beginning with the 1972 platform, in which there is no direct reference to God. Instead, page 5 quotes founding documents "that all men are endowed with certain rights," but even the tone of this quote is much less religious than what will appear in the 1976 version. When referring to draft dodgers on page 10, the platform commends those who serve in the military for obeying "a higher *morality*." Yet still it is unclear whether this is a reference to a religious or secular moral code. Similarly, page 17 refers to the Carter Administration's policy on crime as "undermining the legal and *moral* foundations of our society." Page 26 affirms the Republican "view that voluntary prayer should be freely permitted in public places… thus preserving the traditional separation of church and state." This statement is particularly interesting given the current debate over church and state.[12] The only blessing mentioned in the platform is on page 33, which refers to the blessing of liberty and universal freedoms.

By the 1976 platform, the Republican religiosity is completely transparent. Page 3 clearly states "Our great American Republic was founded on the principle: 'one nation, under *God*[13], with liberty and justice for all'… 'That men… *endowed by their Creator* with certain *unalienable* Rights' and that those rights must not be taken from those to whom *God* has given them." Note the difference between this usage and that of the 1972 usage provided above. Page 8 begins the Republican pro-family[14] theme, which is important to the present discussion as it follows the language of Jerry Falwell, Phyllis Schlafly and other conservative religious right leaders.

Page 8 states "the structure of the family must be strengthened." This is expanded into a plank devoted to The American Family, which states "Families must continue to be the foundation of our nation… [as it is through our families that] our cultural and spiritual heritages are perpetuated, our laws are observed and our values are preserved." It continues "women's and men's concerns with their changing and often conflicting roles [and] high divorce rates… create a hostile atmosphere that erodes family structures and family values… We fear government may be powerful enough to destroy our families."

Abortion appears for the first time in the 1976 platform on page 9 when the Republican state they support "a position on abortion that values human life." This continues on page 11 with "The question of abortion is one of the most difficult and controversial of our time. It is undoubtedly a moral and personal issue but is also involves complex questions relating to medical science and criminal justice." This wording sounds more like Ronald Dworkin's liberal common ground argument[15] than the staunch Republican pro-life position that will follow (particularly by 1988 platform, which can be found in the appendix). In carries on with "We protest the Supreme Court's intrusion into the family structure through its denial of the parents' obligation and right to guide their minor children. The Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue on abortion and supports the efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional amendment to restore the protection of the right to life for unborn children." Although this pro-life position is not shocking today, the evolution of religiosity from the more common ground wording in 1976 to an absolutist stance beginning 1988 coincides with the conservative religious activist focus on abortion. The growth of the movement and its impact on the Republican Party is easily tracked through this single issue. Page 12 mentions charitable institutions for welfare solutions and page 19 has entire plank on Morality in Foreign Policy. Under this added plank, the Republicans state they will "Honestly, openly, and with firm conviction… go forward as a united people to forge a lasting peace in the world based upon our deep belief in the rights of man, the rule of law and guidance by the hand of God."

The increase in religiosity from 1972 to 1976 is clearly evident. Much had changed in this time frame. The Equal Rights Amendment[16] was still awaiting ratification. Roe v. Wade had sparked a national debate with religious organizations mobilizing as pro-life pressure groups. Gay rights organizations, first formed in 1969, continued to grow. Many clergymen

became politically active as they began to see a fundamental need for religion in the public square. In addition, many of the 1976 messages have remained in all Republican platforms up to and including 2000. These messages include the pro-family stance, charitable institution involvement, and the need to blame Democratic liberal permissiveness for the nation's moral decline.[17] As the current analysis need only demonstrate when each party increased its religiosity, religious examples from the 1980 to 1988 Republican platforms are available in supplementary materials available upon request.

Democratic National Platforms

The Democratic National Platforms from 1972 to 1992 speak of religious freedom, morality and respect for those who are different. Yet there is not a single reference to God in any of these documents. Further, the 1988 platform is almost devoid of any direct moral references (as opposed to the rising Republican religiosity fervor in their 1988 platform). The fact that the word God does not appear in a Democratic National Platform until 1996 is stunning when you consider the Republican shift by 1976 as a result of rising conservative religious right pressure groups and the twelve years of Republican presidential leadership that followed. The assertion here is not that religion or Roe v. Wade were the causes for a Democratic Party decline, but that each played a part in that decline. As Elaine Kamarck indicates, this was certainly a period when the Democrats fell out of line with the mainstream and issues perceived as religious were part of the party's problem. Kamarck argues that the Democrats needed to find a way to talk about religion as they could no longer afford to cede God to the Republican Party.[18]

The 1992 Democratic National Platform stepped a toe in the religiosity water presenting itself as a "new covenant" and talking about American values of faith and family. Still, there was no explicit references to God prompting President Bush to say that the Democrat's platform had "left out three simple letters, G-O-D."[19] This changed by the 1996 presidential election. Following the 1994 Republican victory in the House of Representatives and their Contract With America agenda, the religious themes in the Democratic Party's platforms grew. In addition to the religious freedom and morality language of the past, page 1 states "We want an America that gives all Americans the change to live out their dreams and achieve their *God*-given potential." Page 39 references a "*sacred* responsibility" to family and page 42 states "We understand we have a *sacred* obligation to pro-

tect *God's* earth and preserve our qualify of life for our children and our children's children."

By 2000 the platform incorporated all of the religious references from the past and went much further. Page 14 talks about a "*God*-given right to work hard and live the American dream." Pages 18 and 24 discuss faith-based organizations and charitable choice for social services. Page 28 says "Democrats know that for all of us there is no more solemn responsibility than that of *stewards of God's creation*." Page 30 claims "America is *blessed*". Page 31 declares: "Democrats believe that *God* has given the people of our nation not only a chance, but a *mission* to prove to men and women throughout this world that people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, of all faiths and creeds, can not only work and live together, but can enrich and ennoble both themselves and our purpose." Page 33 sums it up that we are "one America – one nation, under *God*[20], with liberty and justice for all."

Platforms Illustrate Shift in Religiosity

These platforms clearly demonstrate the rise in religiosity within presidential campaign discourse, but the reason for this change could be debatable. First, it could be argued that the parties shifted along with the rest of the nation, but this fails to explain why both parties did not shift at the same time. The Republicans began to shift in 1976. The Democrats did not shift until 1996. In addition, the argument that Americans had become more religious is dubious. Even if the Republicans simply caught on to the trend earlier and it took the Democrats twenty years to catch up, the data does not support a proportional rise in American religiousness. For example, church membership as a percentage of the population declined from 69.5 percent in 1965 to 64.4 percent in both 1970 and 1975, and to 63.3 percent in 1997.[21] The number of Americans who said religion was very important in their lives dropped from 70 percent in 1965 to 62 percent in 1998.[22] Church attendance remained basically the same with 41 percent in 1939, 46 percent in 1962, 40 percent in 1998 and most recently 42 in November 2001.[23] According to these numbers, the platform references to God should have either been present in the 1960s and 1970s or decreased proportionately in the platforms. Instead, they grew more explicit and stronger.

Conservative Religious Right and the Republican Party

If not due to an increase in religiousness itself in America, why did religiosity increase in campaign discourse? As mentioned at the onset, this essay attributes the rise in religiosity to conservative religious right activism in the 1970s and the pressure these groups asserted on the Republican Party. This is not to say that religious groups did not oppose government policy prior to Roe v. Wade. Many credit the 1950s "civil religion" period (when God was added to both the Pledge of Allegiance and the national motto In Got We Trust) and the Barry Goldwater campaign in 1964 with the "upsurge in public religiosity."[24] In fact, religious Americans could be found on the left and right of issues throughout the 1960s, but their political involvement was different. Even though "churches and church leaders were in the forefront of the civil rights revolution, the anti-war movement and the war on poverty… [these] religious liberals used their faith to challenge rather than support prevailing government policies and social practices."[25] Up to this point in time, the conservative religious right was most concerned with the Supreme Court decisions against organized prayer and Bible reading in public schools. "The court said these decisions were necessary to protect religious freedoms, but they provoked strong opposition, especially among fundamentalists and other religious conservatives."[26]

The cultural angst of the 1960s, which also included desegregation, the Viet Nam war and protests, and the rise of anti-establishment religious groups (particularly with young Americans) resulted in what Elaine Kamarck calls a cultural realignment.[27] Others attribute the perceived moral and spiritual problems of today to a "cultural shock of the 1960s."[28] There were enormous changes taking place as groups were challenging inequality in foreign policy, race, and gender issues. By the 1970s, everyone was worried about the economy. "But for the incipient Christian Right, what inspired the first wave of activists was a series of key events around the questions of morality, gender, and family relations."[29]

In Sara Diamond's opinion, "The 1973 Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion was the single most galvanizing event in the history of the Christian Right."[30] While conservative Catholics and Christians of all denominations had been involved with recent political issues on the outskirts, this one issue brought them together in the right-to-life movement, which began by focusing on a constitutional amendment to ban abortion. Diamond also points to the 1970s battle against the Equal Rights Amendment. When ratification appeared likely, Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum (a

conservative religious organization originally called Stop ERA) mobilized a national effort to defeat ERA and eventually succeeded.[31] Schlafly remains an important conservative figure today, yet she is important to the present discussion as she was one of the first to "sound the alarm against what she saw as a full-scale 'threat' to the traditional family… She claimed the ERA would make gay marriages legal and prevent the reversal of Roe v. Wade. For Schlafly and others, the set of *profamily* issues was beginning to crystallize into a unified package, with potential action on many fronts."[32]

In 1979 the abortion issue, ERA and election of Jimmy Carter (a born-again Christian) convinced Jerry Falwell and a group of conservative religious leaders[33] that a " newly minted right-wing evangelical fervor" existed. These men "joined together to harness what they perceived as an untapped major political force."[34] They named this new organization the Moral Majority and it quickly became the largest conservative religious right group at that time. The Moral Majority organized state chapters, set up a Washington lobbying office and created a political action committee.[35] "Falwell's organization was well focused and financed… Ronald Reagan visited Falwell's Liberty College and was greeted by a host of religious broadcasters sporting bumper stickers proclaiming 'Christians for Reagan.' The movement brought new voters to the polls in several states…"[36] and has often taken credit for Reagan's 1980 presidential victory.

The rise in religious groups was also part of a larger phenomenon in 1970s, and that was the proliferation of interest groups, PACs and campaign money. It was the beginning of the permanent campaign. Robert Zwier notes that one "major reason for the greater interest in cooperation among groups is the decentralization in Congress as a result of the organizational changes in the 1970s… The average religious interest group… bring[s] legitimacy, stability, a larger constituency, and a moral dimension to such cooperative efforts."[37] So while the conservative religious right groups grew in power during this time due to their moral opposition to abortion and other religious issues, the changes in party organization, elections and campaign money certainly helped their efforts. Perhaps this point helps to explain why the rise in the 1970s is considered such a phenomenon. It is not so much that this was radical fringe. Rather, the religious interest group dynamics and actions represented a great departure from religious groups of the past.[38]

While it is quite contentious just how much of the 1980 Reagan

victory can be attributed to the Moral Majority, the group was determined to make voter registration its primary goal and credible estimates claim they succeeded in registering approximately two million voters.[39] Additionally, the number of Republican white evangelical Protestants grew about 9% between 1978 and 1987.[40] Borrowing from what the Democrats had employed so successfully with the labor unions,[41] the conservative religious right organized direct mail operations, get out the vote drives, and moral report cards[42] for church leaders to pass out the Sunday before election day. Continuing their coverage from 1976, media evangelists used their broadcast programs "to play a vital role in the political mobilization of their audiences."[43] By tapping into "preexisting social networks that have important ongoing significance in their members' lives"[44] and harnessing religious concerns regarding the decline of American morality, the conservative religious right convinced many voters that the Republican Party was the only religious choice in town. From a local, state and nation perspective, the conservative religious right movement opposed gay rights, pornography, abortion, and sex education. As they began to oppose these issues, the Republican platforms began to reflect the same trends often with identical language.

Many question the impact conservative religious right groups actually had on the 1980 Reagan victory. Michael Lienesch argues that their presence cannot be ignored. In fact, he calls the presence of religious activists, "who throughout the 1980s could be seen in ever-increasing numbers at political caucuses, campaign rallies, and party conventions" striking.[45] Ronald Reagan confirmed this when in an April 1980 speech before the Religious Roundtable National Affairs Briefing. He said, "I know you can't endorse me, … but I want you to know that I endorse you."[46] According to Sara Diamond, "Reagan conveyed to the newly aroused Christian Right the message that he was their man, and that he would turn the White House into God's House… The 1980 election was a watershed event because it brought to power a new breed of Republican legislators, people who were more beholden than their predecessors to grassroots right-wing forces back home" both in the White House and Congress.[47] James Guth and John Green argue that "in the 1980s Republicans ardently wooed the religious with traditionalist appeals, apparently with considerable success. The New York Times / CBS Poll found that 81 percent of white 'born-again' Christians voted for Reagan in 1984… accelerating a long-term shift of theologically conservative Protestants (especially younger ones) toward the Republicans."[48] Diamond adds that over two-thirds of the new white religious voters in 1980 voted for Reagan over Carter and that 17 percent

fewer conservative religious voters voted for Carter in 1980 than in 1976.[49]

With the demise of the Moral Majority and Pat Robertson's failed 1988 presidential campaign, many political scientists and journalists were convinced that the conservative religious right movement had ended. Yet in 1989, Pat Robertson formed the Christian Coalition and made Ralph Reed the executive director. Reed and the Christian Coalition were instrumental throughout the 1990s including the Republican's Contract With America and Clinton's impeachment.[50] The conservative religious right groups had become more professional and astute in asserting religiosity into the American political debate. Republicans, according to Kamarck, had taken religiosity and made it a wedge issue for voters.[51] "Liberals criticized the [Christian] coalition for giving a religious cast to secular political issues. What troubles many people… is that certain planks of conservative ideology are made to seem synonymous with being Christian or being religious."[52] One survey that supports this argument found that when Americans were asked whether they thought churches should express their views on day to day political and social issues rather than staying out of politics, the number went up (22 percent agreed in 1965 and 29 percent agreed in 1996).[53] While this is hardly a majority, it represents a significant voting bloc with the today's marginal victories. It is even more interesting in light of the declining religiousness in America, as presented earlier in this essay.

The conservative religious right remain an important voting bloc for the Republicans and their current challenge is to maintain the religious vote while not alienating the moderate and independent voters.[54] By 1996, 78 percent of the conservative religious right were republicans, which differed greatly from the 28 percent of the general population and 30 percent of the general evangelical group.[55] The conservative religious right was made up of 58 percent women, 42 percent men and over 96 percent of white Americans (compared to 79 percent of the general population).[56] This group continued to make an impact in the 2000 Republican primaries for Senator John McCain, according to William Mayer. Mayer argues that McCain made great strides early on for his party's nomination, but he "may have undercut these efforts by delivering several highly publicized attacks on the 'evil influence' of the Christian right within the Republican party."[57] James Ceaser and Andrew Busch concurred stating "though McCain belatedly apologized and made a distinction between the leaders and their grassroots followers, the damage was done."[58]

Democratic Party Shift in Religiosity

Thus far this analysis has demonstrated the presence of religiosity, its effect on party platforms, the rise of conservative religious right groups, and their influence on the Republican Party. The present aim was to go one step further. It must now be established that the Democratic Party was forced to ratchet-up the religiosity in presidential campaign discourse in order to compete with the Republican Party for voters, particularly swing voters with conservative religious beliefs. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate this point is to go directly to the source.

According to Elaine Kamarck, one of the principal architects of the 1996 Democratic National Platform along with Bruce Reed, this shift in the party's campaign strategy was not an accident. It was a "concerted effort" to pull the party back to the center ideologically by telling many conservative Democrats leery of the party's commitment to religious values "Don't worry, you can trust us."[59] Andre Churney, the 2000 Democratic National Platform architect, even joked with Kamarck that he had managed to get *God in there* more than in 1996. Kamarck added that New Democrats consciously armed themselves with a new theme to remind voters that the Republican Party was not alone in representing God. The Democrats has suffered greatly from the 1960s to the early 1990s and the inclusion of religiosity was quite intentional to regain much needed territory.[60] E.J. Dionne, Jr. added a new dimension of this effort when he explained how a venture capitalist organization "arranged the [2000] Democratic ticket… to increase interest in the subjects of religion and politics."[61] Just as the word *family* had once been the buzzword and then became mainstream, the new buzzword is *faith*. "And just as 'pro-family' ideology is not confined to the political right but has influenced liberals, leftists, even feminists, what might be called 'pro-church' sentiment cuts across the political spectrum."[62]

As for the New Democrat shift, Kamarck admitted the focus was to use God, family and party (in that order) throughout the platforms as much as possible.[63] This strategy allowed the Democrats to concentrate "on blunting the strength of religious conservatives instead of competing for their votes." According to Hart, a Democratic pollster in a Survey for the People for the American way, "Democrats have gone out of their way to tell these people [religious conservatives] that they're not welcome in the party." His survey found that "voters' attitudes toward the religious right… found the public shared the movement's concern about a decline in

moral values and did not view the movement as a political threat. Hart's advice [to the Democratic Party] was to debate the specific policy positions advocated by religious conservatives rather than the strength of the religious right or the role of religion in society."[64] David Wilhelm, former Democratic Party chief, concurred when commenting in the early 1990s that the Christian "coalition and its founders… were trying to brand opponents as anti-religious."[65] He continued "that Democrats would be competing for the votes of the religious faithful, too. 'We're a party that in the 1980s lost the flag somehow… I do not want to let the party lose God or the Bible in this election.'"[66] At the time, Wilhelm was speaking about the 1992 presidential election and given the results, he was right.

Conservative Christian Right's Successes

Thus the religiosity in campaign discourse did increase disproportionately to the religiousness of the country. The prevalence of conservative religious right increased along with interest groups, PACs and money at the time. This resulted in an incredible influence of the religious activist groups on the Republican Party. Whether due to the saliency of religious issues by the conservative religious groups or the party itself, the religious interest groups evidently influenced the Republican Party's social policy positions and platform language. The party certainly welcomed the new Republican voters. Just as Falwell had sensed an "untapped major political force,"[67] so did the Republican Party. The Republicans began as early as 1976 espousing the religiosity of a pro-family, traditional values and God-given agenda. These messages evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s to include social, international and economic policy issues.

The rise in religious discourse coincides with the rising importance of religion as a value thus influencing voter choice. The Republicans were able to make religion a wedge issue and subsequently forced the Democrats to incorporate religiosity into its campaign discourse as well. Kamarck and Churney openly admit this occurred and that the increased Democratic Party campaign religiosity was intentional for the last three presidential elections. Beginning with biblical imagery inserted in the 1992 platform, the Democrats followed up with more explicit references to God by 1996 and 2000.

Religiosity and Voter Choice

The final portion of this analysis draws on traditionally accepted party identification and voter analysis theories. Religion has long been considered one of the social factors effecting voter choice. With the voters of today relying more on issues and candidates than parties to make their choices, religiosity plays an ever increasing role in the decision making process. Conservative religious right groups can provide the necessary cues voters need to make rational vote choices.

Jerry Perkins argues that the shift from party politics in the 1960s to more candidate and issue centered politics in the 1970s was vital to the right of conservative religious groups, who were now "organized and vocal. The Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, the National Christian Action Coalition, and, most notably, the Moral Majority led an assault on a perceived immorality of liberal government and the politicians who occupied it."[68] Perkins' study looks at the impact religious beliefs and convictions have on voting choices when mixed with partisanship and ideology. As he explains it, an individual's religious beliefs come before partisanship, ideology, or their evaluations of a conservative religious right group.

In this model, the party identification and ideology also come before the evaluations. All aspects of an individual's decision making process flow through their evaluation of the conservative religious group. In this sense, Perkins argues, the conservative religious groups serves as a conduit for religious fundamentalists, Republicans, and conservatives."[69] The ability of parties to incorporate the religious themes only strengthens this effect.

For many religious Americans, conservative religious right groups have replaced what the parties may have provided in the V.O. Key American Voter model. This is not to say that religion is the only decision factor, but it is an important. In fact, poll data shows that more Americans believed in 2000 that religion can answer all or even most of today's problems than did in 1985. (58 percent in 1985 and 66 percent in 3/2000).[70] Additionally, a 1996 poll indicated that that the majority of Americans (60 percent) believed the governing elite to be irreligious and 52 percent believed they were lacking character.[71] Andrew Kohut cites a Pew survey in which fewer Americans resisted the mix of religion and politics 1999 than in a 1965 Gallup Poll. (53 percent in 1965, 45 percent in 1999.)[72] The ability of conservative religious right groups to provide cues to voters also

gives legitimacy to the candidates and parties. Perhaps this explains why morality and character have become important campaign litmus tests. As David Maser explains, "Many Americans have found the community's emphasis on traditional family values and deep religious faith appealing. As a result, evangelicals have increased both in size and in political and cultural influence over the last 30 years. And many experts on religion expect the growth to continue."[73]

"Religion is a strong and growing force in the way Americans think about politics. It has a bearing on political affiliation, political values, policy attitudes and candidate choice. Its increasing influence on political opinion and behavior rivals factors such as race, region, age, social class and gender… More specifically, religion has a strong impact on the political views of Christian Americans who represent 84 % of the voting age population… Regardless of denomination, people who express more faith are more conservative. People who engage in more religious practices are more conservative. Those who say religion plays a very important role in their lives are more conservative." With the larger percentage of Americans self-identifying themselves as a member of some religion as opposed to agnostic or atheist, particularly following the attacks of September 11, [74] it is critical for both parties to at least neutralize the religious question in the minds of voters by embracing religious messages as part of campaign strategy. Then the question is no longer whether a party is religious, but where each stands on issues in light of that religious view.

John Green argues "The 2000 presidential race was one of the closest in American history, and one reason was a deepening division among and within America's diverse religious communities…The Bush vote was substantially an alliance of observant white Christians and less observant white Protestants. The key constituency was regular worship attending evangelical Protestants, who voted 84 percent for Bush… Taken together, all regularly attending white Christians accounted for almost three-fifths of the Republican presidential ballots… Minority religious faiths and secular votes accounted for one-quarter of Bush's total. The Gore vote was essentially a coalition of minority faiths plus secular voters and less observant white Christians. Black Protestants, who gave 95 percent of their ballots to Gore, formed his strongest constituency... The narrowness of each candidate's religious support helps explain the closeness of the election."[75]

While religion has long been considered a part of the American political process, the rise in religiosity coincides with a weakening of the

wall separating church and state.[76] The impetus for this shift began with the rise of the conservative religious right as a political force in the 1970s. Although this group may not have had a high rate of ballot box victories, it has succeeded in shifting the entire debate to a more religious one thus affecting the campaign promises and eventual policy proposals. The marginal difference in the 2000 election result only proves how much every vote counts, which codifies the need for both parties to appeal to a variety of conservative religious individuals. Religious conservatives are not going anywhere. They have become entrenched as a "political presence that cannot be ignored. For the Republican Party, they are clearly an important - and some say essential - base of political support. 'The Republican Party does not stand a chance of becoming a majority party in America or electing another president without the religious right."[77]

Similarly, the Democrats must find a way to attract many of the same conservative religious voters (other than the extreme right evangelicals). Democrats are just as religious as Republicans and may even agree on the problems. Each party, however, is religious in a different way resulting in different solutions to those same problems. This is what Hart implored the Democratic Party to consider. While embracing religiosity, Democrats must stress how their solutions would appeal to voters. In the end, the impact of the conservative religious right on the Democratic Party is undeniable. They "have wrought a lasting shift on the U.S. political landscape… [and] it is safe to predict that this mobilization will continue or even intensify in the future local, state and national elections."[78]

APPENDIX

Republican National Platforms 1980 to 1988

1980

P age 2 labels the Democratic politicians as "the chief architects of our decline." Page 4 continues "This malaise has become epidemic in Washington. Its cure is government led by Republicans who share the values of the majority of Americans." Page 5 says "we call out to the American people: With God's help…" Page 7 begins first introduces the welfare "poverty trap" and blames the Democrats for this problem. This page also speaks of "compassion and charity." Page 12 reaffirms the party's previous commitment to the ERA and calls for its ratification. Interestingly, given knowledge of Schlafly's franking privileges from Senator Ervin, the platform states "at the discretion of the [Democratic] White House, federal departments launched pressure against states which refused to ratify ERA. Regardless

of one's position on ERA, we demand that this practice cease." Page 13 "We reaffirm our belief in the traditional role and values of the family in our society. The damage being done today to the family takes its greatest toll on women." Page 14 reasserts the party's position on school prayer. Page 19 offers a Family Protection plank, which calls for a White House Conference on families to "express our support for legislation protecting and defending the traditional American family against the ongoing erosion of its base in our family." Page 24 "We commend the religious leaders, community activists, parents, and local officials who are working with fervor and dedication to protect young Americans from the drug plague," which they previous blamed on the permissive Democrats. Page 38 describes the nation as "steeped in the Judeo-Christian ethic and Anglo-Saxon theories of law and right." Page 49 "We will work for the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human lives."

1984

Page 2 speaks of mercy and pity. Page 7 introduces the "taxation of churches, religious schools, or any other religious institutions" for the first time. Page 20 describes religion as one of the "basic building blocks" that come from "self-reliant individuals, prepared to exercise both rights and responsibilities." The Republicans describe the Democrats as follows: "Worst of all, they tried to build their brave new world by assaulting our basic values… They ignored traditional morality. And they still do." Pages 22 and 23 blames welfare for shattering family cohesion, echoing the work of Charles Murray and other conservative researchers that will have an enormous impact on the welfare debate. They blame this on "permissive liberals." Pages 32 and 33 speak of morality and school prayer. "We have enacted legislation to guarantee equal access to school facilities by student religious groups. Mindful of our religious diversity, we reaffirm our commitment to the freedom of religion and speed guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and firmly support the rights of students to openly practice the same, including the right to engage in voluntary prayer in schools." Page 40 reasserts "pro-family" tax codes. Page 47 introduces the Family Protection plank. "During the 1970s, America's families were ravaged by worsening economic conditions and a Washington elite unconcerned with them… Preventing family dissolution… is vital." Page 48 continues with opposition to "gratuitous sex and violence in entertainment media [which] contribute to this sad development." Page 49 "We commend the President for appointing federal judges committed to the rights of law-abiding citizens and traditional family values." Page 51 claims that "the right to property safeguards for citizens all things of value… [including] their religious convictions… Republicans reaffirm this God-given and inalienable right. The unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed. We therefore reaffirm our support for human life amendment to the Constitution, and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply to unborn children… judicial appointments… who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life." For the first time on page 62, Republicans address international affairs and abortions. "Prominent among American ideals is the sanctity of the family. Decisions on family size should be made freely by each family…. As part of our commitment to the family and our opposition to abortion, we will eliminate all U.S. funding for organizations which in any way support abortion or research on abortion methods." Page 64 "To this end, we pledge our continued effort to secure for all people the inherent, God-given rights that Americans have been privileged to enjoy for two centuries."

1988

Page 2 “American is its people: free men and women, with faith in God… This is the continuing American revolution of continuity and change.” Page 20 “As part of our commitment to the family as the building block of economic progress, we believe decisions on family size should be made freely by each family, and we remain opposed to U.S. funding for organizations involved in abortion.” Page 21 “Strong families build strong communities… Republicans believe, as did the framers of the Constitution, that God-given rights of the family come before those of government. It separates us from liberal Democrats… pro-family… We appointed judges who respect family rights, family values…” Pages 21 and 22 “The family’s most important function is to raise the next generation of Americans, handing on to them the Judeo-Christian values of Western civilization and our ideals of liberty.” Page 27 addresses the AIDS crisis for the first time “AIDS education should emphasize that abstinence from drug abuse and sexual activity outside of the marriage is the safest way to avoid infection with the AIDS virus.” It could be argued the Republicans unwillingness to address the issue in 1984 or to mention sympathy for those in the gay community who suffered could be tied to the conservative religious right. The Reagan administration knew of the disease, described as GRIDS (Gay Related Immune Deficiency Syndrome) at the time. Page 27 discusses the care of children by groups “including religious groups” and introduces the concept of “fetal protection” in the workplace. Page 28 “We will require parental consent for unemancipated minors to receive contraceptives from federally funded family planning clinics” Page 30 addresses homelessness and argues that “homelessness demonstrates the failure of liberalism… root causes of the problem…. [destruction of] families.” Page 31 The Republican Party believes “that the Pledge of Allegiance should be recited daily in schools in all States. Students who learn we are ‘one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all’ will shun the politics of fear… In defending religious freedom. Mindful of our religious diversity, we support the right of students to engage in voluntary prayer in schools. We are for full enforcement of the Republican legislation that now guarantees access to school facilities by student religious groups.” Pages 31 and 32 “That the unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life that cannot be infringed. We therefore reaffirm our support for a humane amendment to the Constitution, and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections apply to unborn children… We commend the efforts of those individuals and religious and private organizations that are providing positive alternatives to abortion… We applaud President Reagan’s find record of judicial appointments, and we affirm our support for the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life. That churches, religious schools and any other religious institution should not be taxed…” Page 40 regarding education “our goal is to combine traditional values and enduring truths with the most modern techniques and technology for teaching and learning… Values are the core of good education. A free society needs a moral foundation for its learning. We oppose any program in public schools which provide birth control or abortion services or referrals. Our ‘first line of defense’ to protect our youth from contracting AIDS and other sexually communicable diseases, from teen pregnancy, and from illegal drug use must be abstinence education.” Page 41 one introduces school vouchers. Page 48 states “The drug epidemic didn’t just happen. It was fueled by the liberal attitudes of the 1960s and 1970s that tolerated drug use.” Page 51 “Fathers of welfare dependent children must be held accountable… root causes of poverty. Divorce, desertion, and illegitimacy have been responsible for almost all the increase in child poverty…” This is Charles Murray’s Losing Ground thesis. Page 86 “We commend the Reagan-Bush Administration for its courageous defense of human life in population programs around the world. We support the refusal to fund international organizations involved in abortion.”

Chronology of Religion and Politics in America (Abridged Version)[79]

Colonial Times: Religious dissenters settle many of the original 13 Colonies, but most Colonial governments adopt religious tests for office and religious taxes. Some colonies, however, establish models for religious freedom.
1789-1900: The Constitution prohibits government establishment of religion, but churches play an important part in politics on issues ranging from slavery and social reform to prohibition and public morality.
1900-1960: Strains increase between traditionalist and modernist religions.
1908: The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America is formed and, as its first action, published a pro-labor report called "The Church and Modern Industry."
1910: The first of a series of conservative theological tracts published under the name "The Fundamentals" lays the groundwork for the formation of 20th century fundamentalism.
July 1925: John Scopes, a high school biology teacher in Dayton, Tenn., is convicting of violating state law against teaching the theory of evolution. The conviction is overturned two years later by the state Supreme Court.
1941-1942: Rival fundamentalist organizations are formed: the combative American Council of Christian Churches in 1941, now defunct, and the more moderate National Association of Evangelicals in 1942.
1954: Congress adds the phrase "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance.
1956: Congress makes "In God We Trust" the national motto.
1960s-1970s: Liberal religious groups are active in civil rights and peace movements, while religious conservatives are less active.
September 12, 1960: Democratic presidential nominee John F. Kennedy neutralizes the "Catholic issue" by telling a group of Southern Baptist ministers that his religious beliefs will not dictate his actions if elected.
June 25, 1962: U.S. Supreme Court bars state-written prayer in public school classrooms as an improper establishment of religion; the decision is extend a year later to cover Bible reading in class.
January 22, 1973: U.S. Supreme Court rule in Roe v. Wade that women have a right to abortion during most of a pregnancy. The ruling is supported by most Americans but prompt strong opposition from Catholics and evangelical Protestants.
November 2, 1976: Jimmy Carter, a self-described born-again Christian, is elected president with support from most evangelical voters. Later, evangelicals spurn Carter's politics.
1979: The Rev. Jerry Falwell is recruited to head a new advocacy group, the Moral Majority, to lobby on abortion, pornography and other moral issues.
1980s: The religious right solidly back Republicans Ronald Reagan and George Bush in presidential elections, but most of its agenda is not enacted.
1987-1988: Televangelist Pat Robertson campaigns unsuccessfully for Republican nomination for president.
1989: Robertson forms the Christian Coalition, hiring political activist Ralph E.

Reed as executive director.
1990s: Conservative religious groups mobilize in many states.
November 3, 1992: Democrat Bill Clinton, a churchgoing Southern Baptist with liberal views on social issues, is elected president.
July 1993: Christian Coalition says it will broaden its agenda to economic issues.
1994: Republicans win House majority on Contract With America agenda, taken in large part from the Christian Coalition's "The Contract With the American Family"

Endnotes

[1] Elaine Kamarck, Professor John F. Kennedy School of Government in Boston, phone interview by author, December 6, 2001.

[2] http://pewforum.org/events/0815/ "What's God Got to Do With the American Experiment?" August 15, 2000, Los Angeles. Quote by Cal Thomas, p. 13.

[3] http://www.thenation.com Willis, Ellen, "Freedom From Religion," p. 1.

[4] http://perforum.org/press/releases/030101a.php3

[5] http://www.pewtrusts.com/grants/programs/rel/public_square_glance.cfm

[6] Robert Zwier, "Coalition Strategies of Religious Interest Groups." In Religion and Political Behavior in the United States, Ted G. Jelen, (ed.), p. 171. New York: Praeger, 1989.

[7] Silk, Mark. (ed.) Religion and American Politics: The 2000 Election in Context. Hartford, Connecticut: The Pew Program on Religion and the News Media, Center for the Study for Religion in Public Life, 2000, p. 2.

[8] Kazin, Michael, "Pietists and Pluralists: Religion and American Politicians," in Silk, Mark. (ed.) Religion and American Politics: The 2000 Election in Context. Hartford, Connecticut: The Pew Program on Religion and the News Media, Center for the Study for Religion in Public Life, 2000, p. 72.

[9] http://pewforum.org/news/index.php3?NewsID=105. John C. Green, "Religion and the 2000 Election: Traditional Voting Patterns, Increased Polarization," February 6, 2001.

[10] Pomper, Gerald. Professor Rutgers University, email interview by author, December 3, 2001. Galston, William. Professor University of Maryland, email interview by author, December 4, 2001.

[11] http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/story1a080800.html, p. 1.

[12] http://pewforum.org. Jay Heinrichs, "Religion in Public Life: Religion's Turbulent Public Life (Trust Magazine Article)," November 2001.

[13] Masci, David. "Evangelical Christians." Washington, D.C.: CQ Researcher, September 14, 2001, p. 13. Masci notes that the phrase "under God" was not added until 1954 during a period of "civil religion."

[14] The term "pro-family" was first coined by Phyllis Schlafly and the Eagle Forum.

[15] Dworkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 1994.

[16] 1972 Platform: page 28 "We fully endorse the principle of equal rights, equal opportunities and equal responsibilities for women, and believe that progress in these areas is needed to achieve the full realization of the potentials of American women both in the home and outside the home." Page 29 "We oppose ill-considered proposals, incapable of being administered effectively, which would heavily engage the Federal Government in this area. To continue progress for women's rights, we will work toward: Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment." This is extremely critical to accept the notion that the conservative religious right was able to influence the Republican Party. In 1972, before Roe v. Wade and the formal organization of religious pressure groups, the Republican Party explicitly endorsed the ratification of the ERA. Their position would be tempered over time to accommodate the Phyllis Schlafly's ERA opposition group that eventually received

congressional franking privileges from Republican Senator Ervin [see note 24] to send out anti-ERA literature.

1976 Platform: pages 10 and 11 continued the Republican support for "laws guaranteeing women equal rights. The Republican Party reaffirms its support for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. Our Party was the first national party to endorse the ERA in 1940… The Equal Rights Amendment is the embodiment of this principle and therefore we support its swift ratification."

17 1972 Platform: pages 18 and 19 "The permissiveness of the 1960s left no legacy more insidious than drug abuse…The use of drugs became endowed with a sheen of false glamour identified with social protest. By the time our Nation awakened to this cancerous social ill, it found no major combat weapons available." This is interesting given that it was typically the liberals or Democratic youth protesting, and it was a Republican President Nixon that would have been at the helm during the awakening. Some could argue that this combat weapon would eventually be religion to fight this social ill. Page 27 continues "The anarchy which swept major campuses in the late 1960s penalized no one more severely than the young people themselves… " It continues to credit Nixon with ending the war and "winding down" the youth uprisings.

18 Elaine Kamarck, Professor John F. Kennedy School of Government in Boston, phone interview by author, December 6, 2001.

19 http://pewforum.org/events/0815/ "What's God Got to Do With the American Experiment?" August 15, 2000, Los Angeles, p. 14.

20 Masci, p. 13. Masci notes that the phrase "under God" was not added until 1954 during a period of "civil religion."

21 Bennett, William J. (ed.). The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators: American Society at the End of the Twentieth Century. New York: Broadway Books, 1999, p. 174.

22 Bennett, p. 175.

23 http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm The Gallup Poll. November 8-11, 2001. N=1,005 adults nationwide. MoE± 3. "Did you, yourself, happen to attend church or synagogue in the last seven days, or not?"

24 Masci, p. 13.

25 Masci, p. 13.

26 Masci, p. 13.

27 Elaine Kamarck, Professor John F. Kennedy School of Government in Boston, phone interview by author, December 6, 2001.

28 Masci, p. 5.

29 Diamond, Sara. Not By Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right. New York: The Guilford Press, 1998, p. 63.

30 Diamond, p. 63.

31 Diamond, p. 64.

"Schlafly's Stop ERA organization… created a national network to oppose ratification by the states. Schlafly enjoyed assistance from Senator Sam Ervin (R-NC), the leading opponent of the ERA in Congress. Ervin gave Schlafly his Congressional franking privilege for mailing anti-ERA literature packets to key state legislators."

32 Diamond, p. 64.

33 This group included Howard Phillips, Richard A. Viguerie and Paul Weyrich.

34 Shriver, George H. and Bill J. Leonard, (eds.) Encyclopedia of Religious Controversies in the United States. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997, p. 303.

35 Masci, p. 14.

36 Shriver, p. 303.

37 Zwier, p. 173.

38 Lienesch, Michael, "Right-Wing Religion: Christian Conservatism as a Political Movement." In Political Science Quarterly, Volume 97 Number 3, Fall 1982, p. 407.

39 Diamond, p. 67.

40 http://www.people-press.org/relgrpt.htm. p. 1.

41 Elaine Kamarck, Professor John F. Kennedy School of Government in Boston, phone interview

by author, December 6, 2001.

[42] Lienesch, p. 403.

[43] Diamond, p. 67.

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*Party Platforms provided by the Republican and Democratic National Party Committees, Washington, D.C.

Research Notes

To read the full text of these selected Research Notes, please visit *The Public Purpose* online at http://www.american.edu/spa/grad/public_purpose.html.

Medicare and Doctors

Shani Hernandez, Department of Public Administration

The basis for this research paper is a study conducted by the American Academy of Family Physicians, which stated that 17 percent of family doctors will not take on new Medicare patients. The main reason for this is a new formula Medicare uses to calculate how much money doctors will be paid for their services. The formula was put into use on January first, 2002 spreading decreased payments per medical service over three years for a total decrease of 17 percent by the year 2005. Physicians contend that the costs of supplies, living, staffing, utilities, malpractice insurance and new and better equipment are increasing, therefore it follows that they should be receiving larger, not smaller payments. The lack of doctors who accept Medicare patients is extreme in areas that disproportionately have fewer doctors per capita already, such as Wyoming, rural Pennsylvania and Denver, Colorado. This battleground is a genuine place of concern for public administrators, especially those in the health and human services. Attempts to rein in Medicare's skyrocketing budget often results in demands for increased efficiency from administrators, rather than cutting back on benefits.

Controlling Medicare costs has proven problematic for the government; total Medicare spending rose 24 percent in the last 5 years. Medicare's budget for 2003 is $230 billion and the Congressional Budget Office predicts that by 2006 it will jump to $310 billion. Healthcare programs account for nearly 20 percent of the entire federal budget and Medicare currently provides 40 million people with differing degrees of medical insurance coverage. When the Medicare program was created in 1965, it was not intended to cover the myriad of costs and benefits that is does

today. Since the costs of providing the elderly with medical coverage continues to rise, and elderly interest groups demand increased benefits, we need to ask ourselves how much are we willing to sacrifice, and what are the elderly entitled to? The irony of the situation is that even at a budget of $230 billion, Medicare does not meet the medical needs of the elderly. For that reason we must look at the entire medical field in order to find solutions.

When it comes to Medicare, the interested parties wield quite a bit of political influence. The tug of war between powerful interest groups representing trial lawyers, physicians, the elderly and malpractice insurance carriers makes reform a difficult task for politicians, although every side agrees that serious and widespread reform is necessary. A number of solutions are considered, including privatization, adjusting the cost sharing system, and curbing excessive malpractice awards. Although whichever reforms made are sure to upset any number of powerful lobby groups, they must be done. By some estimates, increased life expectancy and the retirement of baby boomers will double the amount of people on Medicare to 80 million by 2031. Most Americans assume that Medicare will be there to cover their medical needs when they are elderly, however, if we don't enact serious changes to the system, we may have money for few other programs when the year 2031 arrives.

Campaign Finance Reform and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002

Renée Leduc Clarke, Department of Public Administration

The successful passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) in early 2002 has significantly impacted the campaign finance reform debate in the United States. BCRA is the first substantial campaign finance legislation to be passed since the post-Watergate era of the 1970s. The subsequent court cases in this era included *Buckley v. Valeo* which upheld the legality of limits on contributions, but not campaign expenditures. Employing the theories on policy formation developed by John Kingdon, this paper argues that the political, policy and problem streams came together at the end of 2001 particularly due to the Enron controversy. These streams, with the assistance of policy entrepreneurs, successfully opened the policy window leading to the passage and signing of BCRA into law on March 27, 2002.

There are substantial and diverse groups of supporters and oppo-

nents of campaign finance reform and BCRA. Those in support of campaign finance reform argue that large campaign contributions and expenditures are corrupting the American political system and should be brought under control with legislative solutions such as BCRA. Those opposed to campaign finance reform believe any limit on campaign contributions or expenditures constitutes a restriction of political speech that is protected under the First Amendment. Immediately after BCRA was passed, opponents assembled a court case led by Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) challenging the law and its expected violations of free speech. Three of the most contentious provisions in BCRA being cited by a diverse group of plaintiffs in these court cases include the ban on soft money, limits on electioneering communications before elections and the increase in hard money contribution limits. These court cases are still pending in federal district court and will be fast tracked to the Supreme Court for appeal consideration this summer. These court cases deciding the legality of the various provisions of BCRA will have a broad impact on the 2004 federal election cycle. This paper discusses the perspectives of many academics, consultants, lobbyists and legislators on how BCRA and its resulting court action will impact future campaigns and the possible unintended consequences if only parts of this legislation passes the test of the Supreme Court.

The Increased Use of SWAT Teams in the U.S.: Prudence or Overkill?
Gerald McMahon, Justice, Law & Society

Deployment responsibilities for U.S. SWAT teams have expanded from rare emergencies, such as hostage stand-offs, to routine policing practices, such as executing search warrants and conducting preventative patrol. This phenomenon is examined by reviewing the beginnings, growth and deployment trends of U.S. paramilitary policing units. Washington, D.C.'s Emergency Response Team (ERT) is used as a case study for analysis and ERT deployment data for January to November 2002, are presented and analyzed in relation to national deployment patterns. ERT data, for the time period analyzed, demonstrate a similarity to the national trends in SWAT team use. Arguments for and against the present use of paramilitary policing are also discussed. The paper concludes with recommendations for further study of the potential safety impact to officers, suspects and the general population by the increasingly routine use of SWAT teams.

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